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Hypothesis Falsification in the 2-4-6 Number Sequence Test: 
Introducing Imaginary Counterparts 
M. Cowley 
Royal Statistical Society, Fellow Member 2012 
Abstract 
Two main cognitive theories predict that people find refuting evidence that falsifies 
their theorising difficult, if not impossible to consider, even though such reasoning 
may be pivotal to grounding their everyday thoughts in reality (i.e., Poletiek, 1996; 
Klayman & Ha, 1987). In the classic 2-4-6 number sequence task devised by 
psychologists to test such reasoning skills in a simulated environment – people fail the 
test more often than not. In the 2-4-6 task participants try to discover what rule the 
number triple 2-4-6 conforms to. The rule is ‘ascending numbers’, but it is tricky to 
discover this rule. Participants tend to generate hypotheses with the properties of the 
2-4-6 triple, for example, ‘even numbers ascending in twos’. They must search for 
evidence to test whether their hypothesis is the rule. But experimental evidence has 
shown that they tend to generate confirming triples that they expect to be consistent 
with their hypothesis rather than inconsistent falsifying triples. Counter to the two 
main hypothesis testing theories this paper demonstrates that falsification is possible 
in five 2-4-6 task experiments when participants consider an Imaginary Participant’s 
hypothesis. Experiment 1 and 2 show that competition with an opponent hypothesis 
tester facilitates falsification. Experiments 3 to 5 show that the consideration of an 
alternative hypothesis helps this falsification of hypotheses lead to rule discovery. The 
implications of the results for theories of hypothesis testing and reasoning are 
discussed.   
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Hypothesis falsification, evidence that shows a hypothesis to be untrue, has been 
considered the cornerstone of enlightened thinking (Popper, 1959).  Yet the empirical 
evidence suggests that people find falsification difficult if not impossible in their 
everyday thinking (Poletiek, 1996; 2005). Hypotheses may start out as anticipations of 
future events, tentative solutions to problems, or even guesses about occurrences 
around us (e.g., Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Poletiek, 2001). Many aspects of 
cognition require people to inspect whether their hypotheses are accurate by searching 
for evidence.  
Searching for inconsistent evidence that falsifies a hypothesis has a long 
tradition of being considered more rational than searching for consistent evidence that 
confirms a hypothesis in the psychology of reasoning (i.e., Popper, 1959; Wason, 
1960). For example, scientists may need to search for falsifying evidence to ensure 
their theories accurately represent the laws of nature (e.g., Fugelsang, Stein, Green, & 
Dunbar, 2004); military strategists may search for evidence of potential negative 
consequences, such as an opponent army responding to a plan in a way that was not 
anticipated (e.g., Cowley & Byrne, 2004); and problem solving may require searching 
for evidence that a hypothetical solution works out by searching for the possible ways 
a solution may not work out (e.g., Gobet, de Voogt, & Retschitzki 2004). Medical 
experts generate hypotheses to understand the causes of disease in order to develop 
cures for illnesses (e.g., Christensen-Szalansky & Bushyhead, 1981), and they must 
discriminate between relevant and irrelevant symptoms to diagnose illness (e.g., 
Koriat, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980). Consider the following example to illustrate 
the importance of falsification in scientific discovery: 
 
 
You are a scientist and your job is to identify the cause of a dangerous new disease. 
You identify a previously unrecognized virus in tissue samples of symptomatic 
patients and your hypothesis is that this ‘new virus’ is the cause of the disease. 
However, other scientists have identified two viruses, including your new virus in 
their tissue samples. They hypothesise that it is the ‘other virus’ and not the new virus 
that is the cause. Both hypotheses have confirming evidence. A case is reported where 
the new virus is present and the other virus is absent. What should you conclude? 
 
A situation similar to this one faced scientists working on the cause of one of the main 
contemporary major international health crises—the SARS virus. They concluded that 
the ‘new virus’ hypothesis was correct. The case where the ‘other virus’ was absent 
falsified the ‘other virus’ hypothesis and proved that the ‘new virus’ hypothesis was 
right. The example illustrates how falsification can be vital to the discovery of truth. 
 Yet the empirical investigations of hypothesis falsification show that people 
tend to overwhelmingly seek confirming evidence to prove the truth of cherished yet 
untrue hypotheses rather than seek evidence to falsify these hypotheses. This tendency 
to seek consistent confirming evidence and avoid inconsistent falsifying evidence is 
called confirmation bias, and it has been found to be pervasive whether thinking takes 
place in the context of laboratory experiments (e.g., Wason,  1960; Wetherick, 1962; 
Tweney et al., 1980; Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1977; 1978; Poletiek, 1996), social 
contexts (e.g., Snyder & Swann, 1978; Wagenaar, van Koppen, & Crombag, 1993), or 
scientific discovery (e.g., Mitroff, 1974; Gorman, 1995; Kuhn, 1996).  
This paper presents convincing evidence to the contrary and shows that people 
can engage in hypothesis falsification more often than has been found in the reasoning 
literature to date.  This paper will focus on the 2-4-6 task which has been the classic 
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test-bed reasoning task for investigations of hypothesis falsification for over forty 
years. First, a detailed analysis will be presented of the precise logic which is essential 
to disentangling what confirmation and falsification has meant to different researchers 
at different times in the history of reasoning. It is constructive to focus this paper’s 
subsequent experimental analysis on the 2-4-6 task because the results are not only 
directly comparable to the literature, but to the accuracy of the theoretical predictions 
made by the two main theories of hypothesis testing in this task (i.e., Poletiek, 1996; 
2005; Klayman & Ha, 1987). Second, a novel component to the 2-4-6 task is 
introduced. By simply asking people to consider an Imaginary Participant, people 
were able to think about how to falsify a hypothesis. Third, a detailed analysis of the 
theoretical predictions of the two main hypothesis testing theories are explicated, and 
a critical analysis of these predictions is tested with the experiments that follow.  Let 
us turn next to the 2-4-6 task. 
 
The 2-4-6 Task 
In the 2-4-6 task participants are instructed to discover a rule the experimenter has in 
mind that the number triple 2-4-6 conforms to. The participant is analogous to the 
scientist, and the experimenter’s rule is analogous to the law of nature to be 
discovered (Wason, 1960). The experimenter’s rule is simply ‘any ascending 
numbers’ but participants tend to focus on the salient features of the initial 2-4-6 triple 
and generate hypotheses such as ‘even numbers ascending in twos’. They propose 
triples consistent with their hypothesis such as 10-12-14 and 16-18-20, rather than 
triples inconsistent with their hypothesis such as 5-10-15. If they had test their 
hypothesis with at least one triple that is inconsistent with their hypothesis, such as 5-
10-15 which contains odd numbers, their hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending in 
twos’ would be falsified. Participants would then know that odd numbers are 
consistent with the experimenter’s rule and they can infer that their hypothesis 
containing the property of evenness was incorrect.  Instead participants have been 
found to persist in testing with triples that would lead to confirmation such as 10-12-
14 (e.g., Wason, 1960; Poletiek, 1996). This tendency for people to seek out 
information consistent with their hypotheses and avoid inconsistent information is 
termed confirmation bias. The result has been replicated many times in the 2-4-6 task 
(e.g., Tweney  et al., 1980; Gorman, Gorman, Latta, & Cunningham, 1984; Kareev & 
Halberstadt, 1993), and has contributed to the view that human thinking was irrational 
and biased (e.g., Evans, 1989; Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993).  
  Yet the documented inability to search for falsifying evidence to overcome 
untrue hypotheses presents us with a paradox (Poletiek, 1996). How can people be 
irrational hypothesis testers given the scientific and technological advancement they 
are capable of achieving? For example, how can we put a man on the moon if our 
thinking is inherently flawed (Mitroff, 1974)? One possibility is that people are more 
capable of falsification than previously shown. Another possibility, which this paper 
explores next, is that there has been a problem with the classification of people’s 
hypothesis testing in the 2-4-6 task (Wetherick, 1962; Klayman & Ha, 1987).  
 
The logic of hypothesis testing: Forty years of misdiagnosis in the 2-4-6 task? 
Initial classifications of hypothesis testing as confirming and falsifying tests were 
equated with consistent tests (tests that were consistent with the participant’s 
hypothesis) and inconsistent tests (tests that were inconsistent with the participant’s 
hypothesis) (Wason, 1960). But Wetherick (1962) argued against this division. 
Instead, a four-way classification was suggested where confirmation and falsification 
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were split into two different strategies based not only on whether participants 
expected instances to be consistent with their hypothesis but also whether participants 
intended instances to be consistent with the experimenter’s rule. For instance, when a 
participant’s hypothesis is ‘numbers ascending in twos’ and they generate the test 
triple 3-5-7, it is clear that 3-5-7 is consistent with the participant’s hypothesis 
because it ascends in twos. But this test is only a confirming test if the participant 
intends the triple to confirm by also expecting it to be consistent with the 
experimenter’s rule. If the participant expects a ‘yes’ from the experimenter, they are 
attempting to confirm their hypothesis, and they expect their hypothesis is correct. But 
if the participant expects a ‘no’ from the experimenter, they are attempting to falsify 
their hypothesis as they expect their hypothesis is incorrect.  
The same is true for inconsistent tests. For example, when a participant’s 
hypothesis is ‘numbers ascending in twos’ and they generate the test triple 5-10-15, it 
is clear that 5-10-15 is inconsistent with the participant’s hypothesis because it is not 
ascending in twos. However, it is a falsifying test only if the participant intends the 
triple to conform to the experimenter’s rule. If the participant expects a ‘yes’ from the 
experimenter, then they expect a triple that is inconsistent with their hypothesis to be 
consistent with the experimenter’s rule, therefore they expect their hypothesis to be 
incorrect. But, if the participant expects a ‘no’ from the experimenter, then they are in 
fact attempting to confirm. They expect that the triple 5-10-15 is neither inconsistent 
with their hypothesis ‘numbers ascending in twos’ nor with the experimenter’s rule. 
The inconsistent test in this instance is intended to provide confirmation. Inconsistent 
tests can be intended to either confirm or falsify. Later theorists also considered the 
above system to be the best method for classifying confirming and falsifying 
hypothesis tests in the 2-4-6 task (e.g., Poletiek, 1996), but the terminology used to 
describe this classification has changed (Klayman & Ha, 1987; 1989). A test triple 
that is consistent with a hypothesis test  is renamed a positive test, because it is a 
positive instance of the hypothesis, so 3-5-7 is a positive test of the hypothesis 
‘numbers ascending in twos’. A test triple that is inconsistent with a hypothesis test  is 
renamed a negative test, because it is a negative instance of the hypothesis, so 5-10-15 
is a negative instance of the hypothesis ‘numbers ascending in twos’. Positive and 
negative tests have been split into confirming and falsifying sub-classifications: 
positive confirming (i); positive falsifying (ii); negative falsifying (iii); negative 
confirming (iv).  
Although this classification has now been accepted as the best way to classify 
confirming and falsifying hypothesis tests in recent years, earlier research on the 2-4-6 
task tended to rely only on the distinction between positive and negative tests to 
distinguish confirming and falsifying hypothesis testing (e.g., Gorman, Gorman, 
Latta, & Cunningham, 1984; Tweney et al., 1980; Kareev & Halberstadt, 1993). For 
example, when researchers tried to improve participant’s ability to falsify in the 2-4-6 
task by instructing them to falsify, they based their instructions on the concept of 
confirmation as a positive test and falsification as a negative test (e.g., Gorman, 
Gorman, Latta, & Cunningham, 1984; Gorman & Gorman, 1984). Their analysis did 
not record participants’ intention to confirm or falsify, and as a result confirmation 
and falsification may have been confused in many studies (see Klayman, 1995; 
Poletiek, 2001 for review). Critically a test is considered to be a confirming test when 
it is intended to confirm a hypothesis. Likewise, a test is considered  to be a falsifying 
test when it is intended to falsity a hypothesis. To clarify an example of each test type 
is presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1 
 
Table 1:  Categorising confirming and falsifying test types in the 2-4-6 task for the 
                  hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending in twos’. 
_______________________________________________________________
Test triple Is the test triple a Does the person Confirming 
positive or negative  intend the test to or falsifying 
  test?   confirm or falsify? test triple 
_______________________________________________________________ 
    
8-10-12 positive  confirmation expected   Confirming  
 24-26-28 positive  falsification expected     Falsifying 
 5-10-15 negative  falsification expected     Falsifying 
            23-25-27 negative  confirmation expected   Confirming 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 In the 2-4-6 task the terminology of hypothesis testing has not only reflected 
how confirmation and falsification have been measured, but how hypothesis testing 
has been labelled over time. Falsification has sometimes been termed disconfirmation 
in case studies of scientific discovery (e.g., Gorman, 1995a; 1995b). Confirmation has 
sometimes been labelled given the processes underlying the strategy. For example, 
confirming has not always been seen as a conscious process but the result of a 
preconscious bias to attend to information that is positive rather than negative, such as 
attributing more relevance to triples leading to ‘yes’ than ‘no’ responses from the 
experimenter (Evans, 1989). Although recently participants were found to be able to 
use triples that generated feedback of ‘no’. When participants were told there were 
two rules to be discovered they used these negatively labelled triples just as 
effectively as triples that generated ‘yes’ feedback (Gale & Ball, 2003).  
To summarise the different ways researchers have defined hypothesis testing 
strategies over the last forty-five years in the 2-4-6 task, a table is presented below: 
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Table 2 
 
Table 2:  The different ways hypothesis testing strategies have been conceptualised   
                  in hypothesis testing research over the past forty-five years. 
 
Term used  Definition and main author(s) 
 
Severity of test Severity of test is a philosophical term used to refer to 
falsification. A hypothesis tester should test their hypothesis as 
severely as possible. In other words, they should choose a test 
that can result in the strongest possible evidence against a 
hypothesis. This type of hypothesis testing was termed 
falsification (Popper, 1959). 
 
Falsification Falsification became the favoured scientific and psychological 
term used to refer to the severity of test as outlined above. 
Falsification has tended to be associated with the search for 
evidence to show a hypothesis to be untrue (e.g., Wason, 1960). 
 
Confirmation bias Confirmation bias is a tendency to search for evidence that is 
consistent with a hypothesis and avoid inconsistent evidence 
(e.g., Wason, 1960). 
 
Positive and negative 
test strategies A triple that is consistent with a hypothesis is a positive test of 
that hypothesis. For example, the triple 8-10-12 is generated 
when the hypothesis is ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ 
because it contains the target properties of evenness and 
ascending in twos. A triple such as 5-10-15 is inconsistent with 
the hypothesis because it does not contain these target 
properties and it is called a negative test. Participants may have 
a tendency to test cases that have the property of interest rather 
than those that do not have the property in the 2-4-6 task, that 
is, they have a tendency to follow a positive test strategy of 
testing positive instances, which does not necessarily constitute 
a bias in all reasoning contexts (Klayman & Ha, 1987).  
Intentional  
confirmation and  
falsification Confirmation and falsification depend on whether a test is 
consistent with a hypothesis and on whether it is intended to 
confirm or falsify. Participants’ tendency to generate triples that 
are consistent with a currently held hypothesis may not 
constitute a bias, because they may not ‘expect’ a consistent 
triple to result in a confirming response from the experimenter. 
Participants must expect a confirmation for it to constitute a 
confirmation bias. Likewise, participants must expect a 
falsification for it to constitute a falsification (Wetherick, 
1962).  
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Positivity bias One claim is that human reasoning is biased towards attending 
to positive instances of a current representation at a 
preconscious level (Evans, 1989). This tendency corresponds to 
a bias for positive instances of a current hypothesis and 
selecting these positive instances as hypothesis tests 
symptomatic of confirmation bias.  
 
Disconfirmation There may be two levels of hypothesis testing. At the micro-
level hypothesis testing corresponds to individual tests, for 
example one experiment may falsify a hypothesis, but at the 
macro-level hypothesis testing corresponds to a series of tests, 
for example a series of experiments which lead to 
disconfirmation of a theory (Gorman, 1995a). 
 
 
But how do we discern ways of discriminating between confirmation bias, 
non-biased confirmation, and falsification?  First, this paper suggests that a test can be 
considered an instance of confirmation bias in the following circumstances when a 
hypothesis is untrue (Cowley & Byrne, 2004; 2005):  (i) when participants indicate in 
their responses that they intend their test to result in confirmation of their hypothesis, 
even though falsifying evidence is available (in line with Wetherick, 1962, Klayman 
& Ha, 1987; Poletiek, 1996); (ii) or when participants evaluate the result of a test as 
confirming their hypothesis when the test result objectively falsifies their hypothesis.   
Second, this paper suggests that a test can be considered an instance of falsification in 
the following circumstances when a hypothesis is untrue: (i) When falsifying evidence 
is available to the participant, and participants indicate in their responses that they 
intend their test to result in falsification of their hypothesis (in line with Wetherick 
1962; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Poletiek, 1996); (ii) or when participants evaluate the 
result of a test as falsifying their hypothesis  when the test result objectively leads to 
falsification. Third, this paper suggests that a test can be considered an instance of 
non-biased confirmation in the following circumstance: When the hypothesis is true 
or of exceptional quality such that there is very little falsifying evidence to search for, 
and a hypothesis test, even though it is intended to falsify, may result in confirmation 
(e.g., Poletiek, 1996; 2005). In other words when a person seeks to falsify their 
hypothesis as much as possible in order to identify falsifying cases, if any exist. But 
these severe tests in fact lead to confirmation of a hypothesis. In this case the 
hypothesis is confirmed but not in a biased way (Cowley & Byrne 2005). 
1
  
In the next section two main theories are outlined which have been developed 
to explain the findings observed in the 2-4-6 task. The main tenets of each theory are 
explained, and how the factors pertinent to these main tenets affect hypothesis testing. 
The shortcomings of each theory are considered and we describe how the 
experimental designs employed in this paper test the main tenets of the each theory. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 It is important to note the distinction between the process of a test choice and the outcome of a test choice when we 
refer to confirmation and falsification in the above examples. For example, when a hypothesis is generated it may actually 
represent the true state of affairs. To test this hypothesis a person may generate a test with the intention to falsify it, but because 
the hypothesis is in fact true the test outcome can only confirm the hypothesis regardless of the process the person has used (in 
the experimental chapters I detail this point further.   
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Theories of Hypothesis Testing in the 2-4-6 Task 
I will now outline two main theories of hypothesis testing developed from findings in 
the 2-4-6 task. The first theory proposes that people find falsification difficult if not 
impossible in the 2-4-6 task, and that confirming and falsifying are one and the same 
process (Poletiek, 1996; 2001; 2005). This paper will refer to this theory as the 
uniformity theory of hypothesis testing in the 2-4-6 task because it proposes that 
confirming and falsifying testing are the same process. The second theory proposes 
that hypothesis testing is constrained by the mathematical structure of the hypothesis 
testing task at hand (Klayman & Ha, 1987). Klayman and Ha suggest that people find 
it difficult to falsify, not because they find falsification impossible, but because their 
tendency to use positive tests is not conducive to falsification due to the mathematical 
constraints in the standard 2-4-6 task (Klayman & Ha, 1987). This paper will refer to 
this theory as the mathematical relationship theory of hypothesis testing in the 2-4-6 
task. Each theory is now explained in turn and the main tenets of each outlined. 
 
The uniformity theory (Poletiek, 2001) 
Are people able to perform two distinct types of hypothesis tests, that is, confirming 
and falsifying tests? Or do people perform just one type of test that will either lead to 
a confirming or falsifying outcome depending on the quality of the hypothesis rather 
than their own test choice (Poletiek, 1996)? 
Recent evidence from the 2-4-6 task indicates that people cannot sensibly 
intend to confirm or falsify (Poletiek, 1996, Experiment 1). To test hypotheses, people 
perform a test, and the test will either confirm or falsify a hypothesis depending on the 
quality of the hypothesis initially generated (Poletiek, 1996, Experiment 2). In other 
words participants cannot deliberately intend to falsify or control test outcomes in 
order to falsify a hypothesis; hypothesis testing is simply experienced as performing a 
test and therefore confirmation and falsification are the same strategy (Poletiek, 2001; 
2005). In one experiment participants were explicitly instructed to falsify their 
hypothesis in the standard version of the 2-4-6 task (Poletiek, 1996 , Experiment 1). 
The rule to be discovered was the ‘any ascending numbers’ rule and participants were 
instructed to generate their ‘best guess’, that is, their hypotheses about what the rule 
might be. Participants typically generated hypotheses pertaining to ‘evenness’ or 
‘ascending in twos’. The only type of hypothesis test a participant can use to 
intentionally falsify a hypothesis such as ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ in the 
standard 2-4-6 task is a negative falsifying test triple; such as 5-10-15 which they then 
expect to lead to falsification (See Table 1).  
The ability to generate a negative-falsifying test is pivotal to the debate about 
whether people can falsify in a useful way.  Participants were given instructions either 
to ‘test’, ‘confirm’, or ‘falsify’ (Poletiek, 1996). For the ‘test’ and ‘confirm’ 
conditions, the majority of tests fell into the positive confirming category (86% and 
80% respectively),  and few tests fell into the negative falsifying category (0% and 
3% respectively). Participants in the ‘falsify’ condition were instructed to ‘try to test 
in such a way as to get your hypothesis about the rule rejected’ (Poletiek, 1996; 
p.454). The majority of tests in this condition fell into the two confirming categories, 
the positive confirming and negative confirming categories (32% and 54% 
respectively). (See Table 1). Although the participants who were instructed to falsify 
proposed test triples that were negative tests, they in fact intended these tests to 
confirm. It was concluded that people do not seem to be able to make sense of 
falsification because they expect their test result to confirm their hypothesis regardless 
of the tests they proposed. Poletiek (1996)  concludes that people are unable to 
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intentionally perform negative falsifying tests and therefore they find falsification an 
impossible hypothesis testing strategy to conduct. Poletiek explains that negative tests 
are a first reflex to make a mismatch between the hypothesis and test item when 
participants are instructed to falsify, because participants appear to have little insight 
into their test choices. In other words confirmation and falsification are experienced as 
a uniform process by participants, that is, they are experienced as the process of 
carrying out a hypothesis test.  
On the surface this claim may make intuitive sense. However, participants 
may not have been given adequate opportunity to show they could intentionally 
falsify. First, participants were requested to generate three test triples in each 
condition in comparison with the previous literature allowing the generation of a 
minimum of fifteen triples (See Klayman & Ha, 1989), or up to forty five minutes of 
testing (e.g., Wason, 1960). Second, the results report statistical analyses for the first 
test triple only, the remaining two triples were excluded, suggesting that the 
uniformity theory was initially developed from a small data set of ninety-four triples 
(ninety-four people generated one triple each) (Poletiek, 1996, p.455). But negative 
tests do not tend to appear until at least after the first three test triples (Klayman & Ha, 
1989), and attempts at falsification may occur at a later stage in the hypothesis testing 
process (e.g., Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1978). The conclusion that people find it 
impossible to intentionally falsify may be an artifact of the limited opportunity and 
analysis of the data in the experiment.  We summarise the main tenets of Poletiek’s 
uniformity theory in Table 3 below. We suggest experimental tests that may falsify 
the theory by showing hypothesis testers can experience falsification as possible and 
as distinct from confirmation. 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Table 3:  Tenets of the uniformity theory (Poletiek, 1996; 2001) 
    
 
Tenet 1:   Falsification is impossible because it presupposes that people know 
where to find information to intentionally falsify a hypothesis. 
 
Criticism 1:  Falsification may be possible. For example when testing somebody 
else’s as opposed to one’s own hypothesis people may have information 
that will help to generate a falsifying test with the aim of falsifying that 
test. Or people can intentionally generate tests inconsistent with a 
current hypothesis (i.e. negative tests) and expect them to result in 
falsification (i.e. negative tests). Given the opportunity to test more than 
three triples, people may begin to use these negative falsifying tests. 
  
Tenet 2:   Falsification is indistinguishable from confirmation and they are the same 
process, because the strongest attempt at falsification of a hypothesis 
results in the most convincing type of confirming evidence should that 
attempt to falsify fail. 
 
Criticism 2: The strongest attempt at falsification may lead to the most convincing 
type of confirming evidence should that attempt to falsify fail. Even 
though hypothesis testers may choose the same test, for example a 
 10 
negative test in the standard 2-4-6 task, an objective hypothesis tester 
may intend it to falsify, whereas a biased hypothesis tester may intend it 
to confirm. The process of confirmation and falsification may be distinct 
(See Table 1.1).  
 
Tenet 3:  A result of a hypothesis test may be as much a consequence of the quality 
of the hypothesis under test, as of any specific strategy employed by the 
hypothesis tester. 
 
Criticism 3: The result of the hypothesis test may be a consequence of the quality of 
the hypothesis under test, but if hypothesis quality is responsible for the 
test result it implies that people do not have an active role in hypothesis 
testing. But it may be possible for individuals to be active. Consider an 
experiment in which two conditions are compared when the hypothesis 
being tested in each condition is equally untrue and an additional factor 
leads to falsification in one condition and not in the other. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
We turn now to examine the second main theory of hypothesis testing in the 2-4-6 
task—the mathematical relationship theory. 
 
The mathematical relationship theory (Klayman & Ha, 1987) 
The second hypothesis testing theory we describe posits that the type of mathematical 
relationship between the hypothesis under test and the rule to be discovered affects 
hypothesis testing. Consider the situation in the standard 2-4-6 task when the 
participant’s hypothesis is ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ and the properties of 
evenness and ascending in intervals of two are embedded in the experimenter’s rule 
‘any ascending numbers’. ‘Any ascending numbers pertains to any numbers that 
increase by any interval.
2
 Klayman & Ha (1987, 1989) suggest that this embedded 
relationship is the most difficult for participants, because it is the only relationship 
that requires them to discover that their hypothesis is incorrect by generating a 
negative test that leads to falsification, whereas positive tests which participants may 
find easier to generate can lead to falsification in several of the other relationship 
types including another type of embedded relationship. 
 For example, when the experimenter’s rule is ‘any ascending numbers’ and the 
participant’s hypothesis is ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ the triple 3-5-7 is a 
negative test because it is not an instance of ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ as it 
contains odd numbers. When the researcher replies ‘yes’ indicating that a triple with 
odd numbers is consistent with the experimenter’s rule, the hypothesis pertaining to 
evenness is falsified.  
Klayman and Ha point out that this relationship is not representative of the 
majority of hypothesis testing situations that can occur, and people tend to test their 
hypotheses using positive tests, which are more effective at producing falsification in 
other hypothesis testing situations. Consider a scientist researching the cause of a birth 
defect such as Spina bifida. Spina bifida is a neural tube defect affecting spinal chord 
development in the early stages of pregnancy.  Scientists (Molloy & Scott, 2001) 
hypothesized that genetic factors were the cause of the defect. They noticed a high 
                                                 
2
 This embedded relationship is one of five possible relationships that can occur given variations of 
what the experimenter’s rule and the participant’s hypothesis could be. The paper focuses on the three 
relationships relevant to the standard 2-4-6 task and the experiments that follow. 
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incidence rate of babies being born with Spina bifida in the Celtic gene pool of Ireland 
and Scotland. Breakthrough research chose to examine blood samples and family 
history data collected in genetic studies of the Irish population. The choice of an Irish 
test population for examination was a positive test of the hypothesis that genetic 
factors were the cause. This positive test led to a theory of genetic predisposition as a 
major cause of neural tube defects because a significant pattern of neural tube defects 
was observed in relationships among families from the Celtic gene pool.  
Consider if the scientists had carried out a negative test of their hypothesis by 
focussing on the African gene pool that was not composed of the hypothesized risk 
factors. They would have found close to zero percent cases of Spina bifida and their 
search would not yield new information because it would be like searching for a 
needle in a haystack (Klayman & Ha, 1987). This example shows that it may be often 
more useful to examine positive instances from the group composed of the 
hypothesized risk factors in scientific research. For this reason Klayman and Ha 
suggest that people have a tendency to engage in a general positive test strategy 
because they are familiar with the usefulness of engaging in hypothesis testing in real 
world examples. Yet the traditional 2-4-6 task does not allow a positive test to lead to 
falsification. A negative test leads to falsification in one relationship (the typical 2-4-6 
task situation), and a positive test leads to falsification in the other (the situation akin 
to the Spina bifida example). Both of these relationships are called embedded 
situations. Critically, a negative falsifying test is best in the first situation, and a 
positive falsifying test is best in the second. The first embedded relationship is the one 
characteristic of the 2-4-6 task where the experimenter’s rule applies to ‘any 
ascending numbers’ and it overlaps any triples that are even and/or ascend in twos 
such as when the participant’s hypothesis is ‘even numbers ascending in twos’.  This 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 1 (a).  
 
 
Figure 1:  Embedded relationships between a participant’s hypothesis (H) and the     
experimenter’s rule (True Rule). 
 
The only way to intentionally achieve falsification in this relationship is to use 
a negative falsifying test.  For example, consider a participant who generates the triple 
5-10-15 (which is a negative test as ascending in five or odd numbers is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending in twos’), and they expect it to be 
consistent with the true rule. They will receive a ‘yes’ from the experimenter, because 
5-10-15 is consistent with ‘any ascending numbers’, and so they can infer that the 
hypothesis about ‘evenness’ and/or ‘ascending in twos’ cannot be true.  
Consider on the other hand a participant who tries to intentionally falsify by 
generating a positive falsifying test such as 24-26-28 (which is a positive test because 
it is consistent with the hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending in twos’, but they expect 
it to be inconsistent with the true rule). Perhaps the rule only corresponds to triples 
ending in the digits 2, 4, 6, such as 2-4-6, 22-24-26 etc . This time when a ‘yes’ is 
received from the researcher they may not infer that the hypothesis pertaining to 
properties of ‘evenness’ and/or ‘ascending in twos’ is untrue. Although the positive 
 
          H 
True Rule 
 
      H 
   True Rule 
 
      H 
True Rule 
(a) (b) (c) 
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test was intended to falsify, it cannot. It is consistent with the hypothesis and the true 
rule.  
In the second type of embedded relationship it is possible to falsify with a 
positive falsifying test when the participant’s hypothesis overlaps the experimenter’s 
rule, for example, when the hypothesis is ‘numbers ascending in twos’ and the 
experimenter’s rule is this time ‘even numbers ascending in twos’. (See figure 1 b). 
(The relationship is akin to the Spina bifida example). This time the true rule ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’ is embedded within the hypothesis ‘numbers ascending in 
twos’. Consider when a participant generates the triple 3-5-7 (which is a positive test 
as it is consistent with the hypothesis ‘ascending in twos’), and they intend it to falsify 
because they expect it not to be consistent with the experimenter’s rule. This time they 
receive a ‘no’ from the researcher, because 3-5-7 contains odd numbers. They can 
infer that their hypothesis is falsified and it does not correspond to the experimenter’s 
rule because it may pertain to numbers with the property of ‘evenness’. 
Now consider a participant who tries to falsify by generating a negative test 
such as 5-10-15. They may intend this test to falsify by expecting it to be consistent 
with the experimenter’s rule. This time when they receive a ‘no’ from the researcher 
they may not infer that the hypothesis ‘numbers ascending in twos’ is untrue. The 
triple is both inconsistent with their hypothesis and the true rule and so cannot 
discriminate between them (Klayman & Ha, 1987).   
The third situation is when the hypothesis is the same as the experimenter’s 
rule. where the hypothesis ‘any ascending numbers’  completely overlaps the true rule 
‘any ascending numbers’. (See figure 1c). When a participant generates a positive test 
triple such as 24-26-28, even if it is intended to falsify it receives a ‘yes’ response. 
This leads to ambiguous confirmation because ‘any ascending numbers’ contains an 
infinite number of triples that can be confirmed. And negative test triples such as 6-4-
2 receive a ‘no’ response (because descending numbers are not consistent with the 
true rule ‘any ascending numbers’). When a descending triple receives a ‘no’ it does 
not help the participant infer that their hypothesis ‘any ascending numbers’ is 
certainly the true rule.  It is not possible to be certain that the hypothesis is the truth, 
but it is still possible to attempt to falsify it. Each failed attempt to falsify indicates 
that a hypothesis is at least close to the truth (Popper, 1959).  
Klayman and Ha distinguish between positive or negative test strategies, and 
they suggest that participants generally ‘choose’ to generate positive test strategies 
rather than negative test strategies  (pace Poletiek, 2001). They also indicate that 
people may find falsification possible using a negative test strategy when they are 
aware of what the relationship between the hypothesis and the rule to be discovered is 
(Klayman & Ha, 1989). However, their account does suggest that the hypothesis tester 
largely plays a passive role in hypothesis testing because they suggest the 
mathematical relationship between the hypothesis and the truth (in this case the 
experimenter’s rule) is the major factor controlling how effective a participant’s 
choice in hypothesis testing is. This suggestion is akin to the view of the uniformity 
theory which proposes that hypothesis quality creates a passive role for the hypothesis 
tester (e.g., Poletiek, 1996). Both the mathematical relationship theory and the 
uniformity theory suggest the hypothesis tester is largely at the mercy of the 
properties of their hypothesis (i.e., the quality of the hypothesis and the relationship 
between the hypothesis and the truth), post-hypothesis generation. If this assertion is 
true it implies that the discussion of hypothesis testing as being biased or rational may 
be redundant because people may not be in a position to actively pursue a confirming 
or falsifying strategy, and research should start to focus more on a previous stage in 
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the process such as the hypothesis generation stage. An important objective for this 
paper is to investigate whether people choose their tests in a way that reflects an 
active role for a hypothesis tester. 
In Table 4 below the main tenets of Klayman and Ha’s mathematical 
relationship theory are explained. Accordingly, the experimental tests that may falsify 
the theory are detailed. 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Table 4:  Tenets of the mathematical relationship theory (Klayman & Ha, 1987; 1989)
   
 
Tenet 1:   There is a tendency to test instances that are consistent with a 
hypothesis. This tendency is called a positive test strategy and it is 
usually a helpful strategy in hypothesis testing, such as in the Spina 
bifida example. In the 2-4-6 task a positive test strategy is not the same 
as confirmation bias. Even if the participant intends their positive test to 
lead to falsification, it can only lead to confirmation of their incorrect 
hypothesis. The relationship between the hypothesis and the true rule 
constrains the effectiveness of the positive test strategy. Only negative 
tests can falsify in the mathematical relationship standard of 2-4-6 task; 
but participants find it difficult to disengage from positive testing and 
that is why they are not successful. 
 
Criticism 1:  People sometimes successfully discover the rule in the 2-4-6 task. 
Perhaps there are conditions under which people readily follow a 
negative test strategy, for example, when they are competing with an 
opponent. The finding that participants disengage from positive to 
negative tests in the embedded relationship typical of the 2-4-6 task, 
with or without knowledge of task constraints, would indicate that the 
mathematical relationship alone cannot predict hypothesis testing—
people can play an active role in hypothesis testing. For example, when 
people consider an alternative hypothesis in addition to the initial 
hypothesis they may generate negative tests. 
 
Tenet 2:      People often do not know when a positive test strategy is wise and when 
it is not. 
 
Criticism 2: If people can show that they know when it is wise not to use a positive 
test strategy, and rely on a negative test strategy instead, then they do 
know when a positive test strategy will not work.  For example, when 
people test a hypothesis belonging to somebody else that they know is 
untrue, they may rely on negative tests. 
 
Tenet 3:  The mathematical relationship between the hypothesis and the 
experimenter’s rule affects how useful positive and negative test 
strategies are. 
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Criticism 3: The mathematical relationship only affects whether or not a positive or 
negative test will lead to a confirming or falsifying outcome. The 
relationship does not affect the part of the process where people intend to 
falsify or confirm. For example, when people compete with an opponent 
hypothesis tester, they may attempt to falsify their hypotheses by 
generating negative tests, but they may actually intend these negative 
tests to confirm.   
 
A critical question to ask is whether the ability to falsify in an embedded relationship 
using a negative test is important to hypothesis testing in the real world? Consider a 
how a prejudiced belief may be embedded by the truth because it consists of a smaller 
set of positive instances confirming a belief within the total population of the group 
against which the prejudice is targeted.  A negative instance which would falsify this 
untrue belief exists outside of that set. For example, if someone held the prejudiced 
belief that Jews were lesser beings they may cite cases which are consistent (positive 
instances) with this belief, such as a person with a criminal record who was also 
Jewish, and avoid any inconsistent instances (negative instances) which exist outside 
of their collection of confirming evidence. But a falsifying case would be available in 
the story of Anne Frank, and one falsifying case can prove that this prejudiced belief 
is false. The standard version of the 2-4-6 task, when the participant’s hypothesis is 
embedded within the true rule, is analogically equivalent to this prejudiced belief 
(Wason, 1960).  Thus if people cannot falsify in this situation then they are being 
irrational.  
But there have been some accounts of successful rule discovery in the 2-4-6 
task. While the mechanisms by which participants have been successful are presently 
ill-specified the presentation of an alternative hypothesis appears to help. Next the 
paper briefly outlines some accounts of improved rule discovery in the 2-4-6 task and 
show how such accounts provided hints to the development of an ecologically valid 
standard 2-4-6 task in the experiments that follow.  
 
Alternative Hypotheses: the key to successful hypothesis testing 
Presently there is a collection of novel experimental findings relating to the role 
alternative hypotheses have in helping the discovery of the truth in the 2-4-6 task. The 
first experimental result to highlight the facilitating role of considering alternative 
hypotheses in rule discovery was the DAX-MED experiment carried out in the 2-4-6 
task (Tweney et al., 1980). Participants were told that there were two rules to be 
discovered; a DAX rule and a MED rule. The DAX rule was the standard ‘any 
ascending numbers’ rule and the MED rule was ‘any other number sequence which 
does not ascend’. Participants were instructed to generate number triples and the 
researcher responded with the feedback ‘DAX’ or ‘MED’ rather than ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
respectively. Participants discovered the rule ‘any ascending numbers’ significantly 
more frequently than the usual 21% rule discovery rate; 60-80% of participants tend 
to discover the rule in DAX-MED manipulations, even though they have generated 
the same number of test triples (e.g., Valle-Tourangeau, Austin & Rankin, 1995; 
Wharton, Cheng & Wickens, 1993; Gale & Ball, 2003; 2005). 
Little is known about how considering alternative hypotheses facilitates rule 
discovery.  
A second explanation was that people’s bias to process information with a 
positive label ‘DAX’ or ‘MED’a s opposed to a negative label, for example ‘yes’ 
versus ‘no’ allowed  the processing of more triples (e.g., Evans, 1989). But 
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participants who were asked to either discover one rule or two rules performed well 
regardless of linguistic labelling (Gale & Ball, 2003). A third explanation is that the 
DAX-MED manipulation induces a mental representation which requires less effort to 
switch between two alternative hypotheses and test them both simultaneously. That is, 
the two hypotheses are complementary to one another; one is ‘ascending’ and one is 
‘not ascending’ (Wharton, Cheng, & Wickens, 1993). But similar rule discovery rates 
were found in a condition with feedback inducing non-complementary representation 
by labeling triples ‘DAX’-‘MED’-‘DAX or MED’ (Vallee-Tourangeau et al., 1995). 
Oaksford & Chater (1994) suggest that participants may find the consideration 
of an alternative hypothesis useful because it helps them to decide which information 
to include or exclude from their hypothesis. For example, if the hypothesis under test 
is ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ and the experimenter’s rule is ‘any ascending 
numbers’ participants may generate the alternative hypothesis ‘numbers ascending in 
twos’ which excludes the property of evenness (see also Farris & Revlin, 1989). 
Participants may then generate the triple 5-7-9, which ascends in twos, and ascends 
but is not even. If participants receive a ‘yes’ response from the experimenter for the 
triple 5-7-9, then they can revise their hypothesis to ‘numbers ascending in twos’ by 
excluding the property of evenness (see also Gale & Ball, 2005). Oaksford and 
Chater’s account assumes that participants need to generate a specific alternative at 
the outset in order to discover what should be excluded from a hypothesis. That is, 
participants may implicitly represent the concept that another alternative exists and 
that it may offer a better explanation than their hypothesis.   
In sum, despite the wealth of findings from research on hypothesis testing in 
the 2-4-6 we do not know if people can falsify, nor do we know if they can actively 
choose their hypothesis testing strategy, even though an active role is vital to proving 
that reasoning can be biased (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) or rational 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). In the experiments that follow an active factor that has been 
traditionally overlooked in hypothesis testing—competition is examined.  
 
The Imaginary Participant 2-4-6 Task 
This paper suggests that people might have a tendency to falsify in competitive 
situations because hypothesis testing in realistic settings may proceed by testing other 
people’s hypothesis or interacting with an opponent. An Imaginary Participant called 
‘Peter’3 is introduced to the standard 2-4-6 task and asked people to sometimes 
consider Peter’s hypothesis and to sometimes consider an opponent called Peter.  This 
Imaginary Participant 2-4-6 task was intended to be akin to real world situations. For 
example, scientists may often proceed by attempting to confirm their own hypotheses 
and falsify other scientists’ hypotheses (e.g., Mitroff, 1974; Gorman, 1995a; Kuhn, 
1996; Fugelsang et al., 2004),legal experts need to not only compete with opposition 
barristers, but to ensure that the grounds on which they base their legal arguments are 
irrefutable (e.g., Roberts & Zuckerman, 2005), and military strategists must engage 
with opposition forces, and ensure that they consider each possible alternative at the 
disposal of the opponent to their hypothesized plans of action (e.g., Mallie, 2001).   
Perhaps with competition participants may either have their own alternative 
hypotheses from which to generate falsifying tests or understand that there are 
alternative hypotheses that an opponent hypothesis tester may be considering. Or 
when alternatives belonging to an opponent are non-explicit, the competition may 
                                                 
3
 In honor of the late Peter Wason who invented the 2-4-6 task. 
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prompt participants to flesh out these properties to consider what the opponent’s 
alternatives might be.  
The uniformity theory predicts that competitive factors should not help people 
to intentionally confirm or falsify their hypotheses using negative tests because they 
are one and the same process (Poletiek, 1996; 2001; 2005).  The mathematical 
relationship theory predicts that competitive factors should have no effect on 
hypothesis testing. The mathematical properties of the task affect how successful 
hypothesis testing is in the standard 2-4-6 task (Klayman & Ha, 1987; 1989). Let us 
examine if these predictions hold in Experiment 1. 
 
 
This experiment examines if ownership of a hypothesis is a competitive factor that 
affects falsification when the mathematical relationships in each experimental 
condition are identical. In the first condition participants are instructed to test ‘Peter’s 
hypothesis: even numbers ascending in twos’. In the second condition participants are 
instructed to test ‘Your hypothesis: even numbers ascending in twos’. The 
experimenter’s rule is ‘any ascending numbers’.  
Participants were predicted to not only generate more negative falsifying tests 
of an imaginary participant’s hypothesis than their own, but that they will expect these 
negative tests to falsify. Hypothesis ownership was predicted to be a competitive 
factor that affects hypothesis falsification.    
 
Materials and Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions (n = 16 in each): in one 
condition the low-quality embedded hypothesis was identified as belonging to the 
“imaginary participant” Peter (Peter’s hypothesis is ‘even numbers ascending in 
twos’) and in the other the identical hypothesis was identified as belonging to the 
participant (Your hypothesis is ‘even numbers ascending in twos’). Participants were 
not made aware of what the experimenter’s rule was. Crucially, the relationship 
between the hypothesis and the true rule was identical. Several factors were controlled 
for. First, the hypotheses are equally incorrect, so any differences observed in testing 
behaviour cannot be explained by the quality of the hypothesis and the amount of 
available evidence for participants (Poletiek, 1996, Experiment 2; Klayman & Ha, 
1987). Second, the mathematical relationship between the hypothesis under test and 
the experimenter’s rule is the same in each condition, so any differences observed in 
hypothesis testing between the two conditions cannot be explained by the 
mathematical relationship theory either (Klayman & Ha, 1987).  Third, the 
participants in both conditions were given the hypothesis for testing, they did not 
generate the hypotheses to rule out explanations related to personal investment (e.g., 
Kunda, 1987; 2000). See Appendix A for the complete text of instructions given to 
participants. 
 
Participants and procedure 
Thirty two people who were members of the general public volunteered and were paid 
a nominal fee of 8 Euro per hour. There were 23 women and 9 men and their age 
ranged from 20 years to 75 years, with a mean age of 51 years. No participants had 
taken courses in the philosophy of science. Participants were tested individually. The 
testing session lasted approximately 20 minutes. Each participant was given a three-
page recording sheet which had 5 columns. Appendix B provides a copy of the 
recording sheet. Participants wrote down their ‘number sequence’, ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
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answers to the questions,  ‘do you expect it to conform to Peter’s rule?’ (i.e., positive 
or negative test), and ‘do you expect it to conform to the experimenter’s rule?’ (i.e., 
intend to confirm or falsify). Feedback was given in the form of a ‘y’ for a yes and an 
‘n’ for a no as to whether or not the generated number sequence conformed to the 
experimenter’s rule. There were 18 rows in the recording sheet. There were also spare 
sheets for participants to insert as many tests as they considered necessary.  
 
 
 
Results and discussion 
Number of triples 
In total, 184 triples were generated, with a mean of 5.75 triples per participant. A 
similar number of test triples were generated for the imaginary participant’s 
hypothesis (M = 6.0) and for participants’ own hypothesis (M = 5.5). Participants did 
not generate more tests of the hypothesis belonging to the imaginary participant Peter 
significantly more than their own hypothesis.  
 
Positive and Negative tests 
Participants generated more negative tests of Peter’s hypothesis (46%) than of their 
own hypothesis (25%), but this difference was not reliable (chi
2
 = 10.492 (6), p = 
.052). Participants generated fewer positive tests of Peter’s hypothesis (54%), than of 
their own hypothesis (75%, chi
2
 = 18.619 (9), p = .015).  
 
 
Table 5 
 
Table5: Percentages of positive and negative tests generated in Experiment 1 
. 
 
    Peter’s   Own 
        hypothesis  hypothesis  
   ______________________________________________________________ 
     
     Positive tests   54   75 
     
     Negative tests            46   25  
    ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The result that participants generated negative tests readily for the imaginary 
participant’s hypothesis does not corroborate the mathematical relationship theory or 
the prediction that people engage more readily in a positive test strategy than a 
negative test strategy in hypothesis testing (Klayman & Ha, 1989). The mathematical 
relationships between the hypothesis and the rule were identical in each case. 
Participants generated more negative tests of the imaginary participant’s hypothesis 
than their own, even though the hypothesis quality was the same (Poletiek, 1996). The 
experiment shows that hypothesis ownership can affect the generation of hypothesis 
test types.  
 
 
 18 
Falsification and confirmation 
Did participants intend to use their positive and negative tests differently to test the 
imaginary participant’s hypothesis than their own? Participants generated more 
negative falsifying tests, when the hypothesis belonged to Peter (32%) than when the 
hypothesis was their own (7%), but this difference was not reliable, chi
2
 = 2.667 (4), p 
= .307 as Table 5 shows. Participants intended their positive tests to falsify Peter’s 
hypothesis a similar amount to their own hypothesis (8% vs 9% respectively, chi
2
 = 
3.143 (3), p = .185). Overall participants tested Peter’s hypothesis less with falsifying 
tests (40% vs 60%), although the difference was not reliable chi
2
 = 5.25 (5), p = .193. 
Although participants generated more negative falsifying tests than is usual in the 
standard 2-4-6 task, hypothesis ownership does not have a significant effect on the 
generation of negative tests which are expected to falsify.  
Participants expected their positive tests to confirm reliably more often when 
the hypothesis was their own than when the hypothesis belonged to Peter (67% vs 
46%, chi
2
 = 17.571, df = 9, p = .02), as Table 3.2 shows. Participants expected their 
negative tests to confirm as often when the hypothesis was their own as when it 
belonged to Peter (17% vs 14%, chi
2
 = 4.4, df = 5, p = .246). Overall participants 
tested their own untrue hypotheses with confirming tests (84%) more than the 
imaginary participant Peter’s (60%), but this difference was not significant (chi2 = 
15.067 (10), p = 0.06). The results show that confirming your own hypothesis may be 
easier than confirming someone else’s.  Hypothesis ownership affects the generation 
of confirming hypothesis tests even though the relationship between the hypothesis 
and the experimenter’s rule was not made explicit to participants (Klayman & Ha, 
1987), nor was there an explicit alternative presented to participants (Klayman & Ha, 
1989; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).  
 
Using falsification to abandon low-quality hypotheses 
An important question is how participants used the falsifying and confirming test 
triples to reach the discovery whether they thought the untrue hypothesis they were 
testing was the rule or not. The results showed that more participants abandoned the 
untrue hypothesis when it belonged to Peter (62%) than when it was their own (38%), 
and fewer participants decided to abandon the low-quality hypothesis when they 
finished testing their own hypothesis  (25% ) than when they finished testing Peter’s 
(75%), and this result was reliable (chi
2
 = 4.571 (1), p = .016). 
The result suggests that people not only find falsification to be possible but 
they also find it to be useful: they can use it to abandon untrue hypotheses. The major 
implication of this experiment is that the role of the hypothesis tester is not totally 
constrained by the mathematical properties of the problem (Klayman & Ha, 1987). 
The effect of hypothesis ownership on the generation of positive and negative tests, 
and the intention to turn these tests into confirming or falsifying ones, shows that 
hypothesis testing cannot be completely explained by the mathematical relationship 
between the hypothesis and the evidence. The hypothesis tester has their own active 
role both in the selection of hypothesis tests and in the interpretation of the test 
results, and this role cannot be completely explained by the constraints placed upon 
the hypothesis tester by the mathematical properties of the problem.  
People appear to be able to consider how other people’s hypotheses might be 
false, but can people falsify their own in a competitive context? The next experiment 
addresses this question by introducing a previously unexplored factor in hypothesis 
testing in the 2-4-6 task—direct competition with an opponent.  
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Experiment 2 
Let us now test if the presence of an opponent hypothesis tester prompts participants 
to generate negative falsifying tests more readily when they consider an opponent 
hypothesis tester who is also testing their hypothesis, than when they do not consider 
an opponent.  
 
Materials and design 
Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions (n = 16 in each): in both 
conditions the incorrect embedded hypothesis was identified as belonging to the 
participant (Your hypothesis is ‘even numbers ascending in twos’). In the 
experimental condition participants were given additional information about an 
opponent hypothesis tester (‘However, an opponent called Peter is also testing ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’). Participants were not made aware of what the 
experimenter’s rule was. Crucially, the relationship between the hypothesis and the 
true rule was identical. See Appendix B for the instructions given to participants. 
 
Participants and procedure 
Thirty two people who were members of the general student population in Trinity 
College, University of Dublin volunteered, and were given a minor reward of one bar 
of chocolate. There were 26 women and 6 men whose ages ranged from 18 years to 
27 years, with a mean age of 20 years. No participants had taken courses in the 
philosophy of science. Participants were tested individually or in a group of up to 
three people. 
 
Results and discussion 
Number of triples 
In total 147 triples were generated, with a mean of 4.6 triples per participant. A 
similar number of test triples were generated when participants were told there was an 
opponent hypothesis tester (M = 4.75) and when they were not (M = 4.44), (Mann-
Whitney U = 125.00, Z = -.118, p = .906, two-tailed). The consideration of an 
opponent hypothesis tester did not encourage participants to test their hypothesis with 
more tests than when there was no opponent.  
 
Positive and negative tests  
Participants generated more negative tests when there was an opponent (62%) than 
when there was no opponent (21%), and more positive tests when there was no 
opponent (79%) than when there was an opponent (38%); this pattern was reliable, 
chi
2
 = 4.5 (1), p = .038, two-tailed as Table _ shows.  
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Table 6 
 
Table 6: Percentages of positive and negative tests generated by participants for their 
own hypotheses when an opponent hypothesis tester was absent or present. 
 
       No opponent        Opponent 
      
    _______________________________________________________________ 
 
    
  Positive      79   38 
 
  Negative      21   62 
  
    _______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The result that participants generated more negative tests and fewer positive tests in 
situations in which the mathematical between the hypothesis and the truth were 
identical implies that the mathematical relationship theory cannot explain how the 
interaction with an opponent affects hypothesis testing (i.e., Klayman & Ha, 1987). In 
each case the participant owns an equally untrue hypothesis but the interaction with an 
opponent facilitates the generation of negative tests which can lead to falsification. 
The major implication is that participants play an active role in the choice of their 
hypothesis tests (Poletiek, 1996; 2005). 
 
Falsification and confirmation 
Do participants intend to use their positive and negative tests differently to test their 
hypothesis when there is an opponent? Overall participants generated a similar 
amount of confirming tests whether or not there was an opponent hypothesis tester 
(91% vs 88%), but the types of confirming tests differed. Participants generated more 
positive confirming tests when there was no opponent (75%) than when there was an 
opponent (37%), although the difference was not reliable, chi
2 
= 8.067 (7), p = .164. 
4
  
Participants who considered the opponent hypothesis tester generated negative 
tests reliably more than participants who did not consider an opponent, but they 
intended the negative tests to confirm. Participants in the opponent condition expected 
their negative triples to be inconsistent with the experimenter’s rule, thereby 
confirming their hypothesis. Participants in the opponent condition generated these 
negative confirming tests (54%) reliably more often than participants in the no 
opponent condition, (13%, chi
2
 = 11.4 (6), p = .039). This result is an important one 
because it is similar to another result in the hypothesis testing literature on problem 
solving in which novice chess players tend to see only how their opponent’s 
countermoves can make their plans work even though these moves lead to negative 
falsifying consequences.  
Participants generated too few falsifying tests to warrant a statistical analysis. 
However, they did generate the same amount of negative falsifying tests whether an 
                                                 
4
 (This raises the possible question of power because there is a 40% difference and the p value is not 
significant. In fact the reason for this non-significance is a result of the degrees of freedom that are 
sometimes elevated because participants do not generate the same number of triples in each case of the 
chi square matrix; Hollander & Wolfe, 1999). 
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opponent hypothesis tester was present or not (8% in each case). They generated a 
small amount of positive falsifying tests irrespective of whether an opponent 
hypothesis tester was present (1% vs 4%). In both conditions the participants tested 
their hypothesis that belonged to themselves rather than an imaginary participant, and 
the rates of falsification were low. For example, participants tested their own 
hypothesis with falsifying tests when an opponent hypothesis tester was not present 
only a small amount of the time (12%). This result replicates the previous experiment 
which showed that participants did not falsify their own hypotheses (16% were 
falsifying tests). 
The introduction of an opponent hypothesis tester affected the types of 
hypothesis testing; participants changed the type of confirming tests they performed, 
from positive confirming tests when there was no opponent, to negative confirming 
tests when there was an opponent. This result does not corroborate the uniformity 
theory which predicts that people experience hypothesis testing as one and the same 
process regardless of other factors (Poletiek, 2001; 2005) Hypothesis testing cannot 
be explained by mathematical theories positing that the relationship between the 
hypothesis under test and the experimenter’s rule constrains hypothesis testing; the 
relationships were identical in both conditions, and participants generated different 
types of tests (Klayman & Ha, 1987).  
 
Using falsification to abandon low-quality hypotheses 
Somewhat more participants abandoned the low-quality hypothesis when there was an 
opponent (56%) than when there was no opponent (38%), and somewhat fewer 
participants endorsed the low-quality hypothesis when there was an opponent (44%) 
than when there was no opponent (62%), but the difference was not reliable, chi
2
 = 
1.129 (1), p = .288, two-tailed. This result may indicate that participants are somewhat 
better able to successfully discover that their hypothesis is untrue when an opponent 
hypothesis tester is introduced. By generating negative tests, participants did in fact 
receive falsification even though they did not expect it; but they tended to ignore this 
falsification. This result indicates that there may be a bias not only in the search for 
tests of one’s hypothesis, but also in the interpretation of the test result.  
The imaginary participant experiments in this chapter point out that 
competition affects hypothesis testing. This is a novel result and it does not 
corroborate the tenets of the two main alternative theories of hypothesis testing, which 
importantly were also developed from findings in the 2-4-6 task. What facilitates the 
ability to generate a negative test that has the potential to falsify a hypothesis? The 
hypothesis testing literature has tended to show that successful hypothesis falsification 
depends on the consideration of explicit alternative hypotheses. (e.g., Tweney et al., 
1980). Is it reasonable to suggest that competition helps people to consider alternative 
hypotheses, and thus help them to generate counterexamples; in this case negative 
tests? Experiments 3 to 5 examines how the consideration of alternative hypotheses 
may help hypothesis falsification. A detailed analysis of how alternative hypotheses, 
explicit representation of alternative possibilities, and competition relate to one 
another in order to create a more detailed picture of hypothesis testing.  
 
 
Experiment 3 
This experiment aims to investigate if people can use negative tests to intentionally 
falsify a hypothesis. One way to show that people can intentionally falsify hypotheses 
is to investigate if they exhibit insight into the implications of particular test choices, 
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by understanding how they will be interpreted by the Imaginary Participant. This 
experiment tests whether people can intentionally falsify a low-quality hypothesis 
belonging to someone else (Peter) when they consider a higher quality alternative 
hypothesis that indicates that the hypothesis under test is false. The prediction that it 
may be possible to generate falsifying tests to communicate to another, because 
participants are presented with an alternative hypothesis which they know is the 
solution, was made. This alternative hypothesis may present participant’s with the 
knowledge to intentionally falsify Peter’s hypothesis in much in the same way a 
teacher falsifies a student’s inaccurate hypothesis. The experiment also tests whether 
the quality of the hypothesis under test may determine the availability of confirming 
or falsifying evidence and hence the extent people can confirm or falsify. To this end 
it is constructive to compare participants testing a low-quality hypothesis belonging to 
Peter and compare their hypothesis testing to participants testing a high-quality 
hypothesis belonging to Peter (a high-quality hypothesis refers to a hypothesis that is 
representative of the truth).  
 
Materials and design 
One group of participants were told that Peter hypothesised that the rule was ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’ (low-quality hypothesis), and another group were told 
that Peter hypothesized that the rule was ‘any ascending numbers’ (high-quality 
hypothesis , which is in fact the researcher’s rule). Hypothesis quality in this instance 
refers to how closely the hypothesised rule fits the experimenter’s rule. The 
experimenter’s rule was the standard ‘any ascending numbers’. Half of the 
participants in each case of hypothesis quality were given knowledge about 
hypothesis quality by being told the solution to the 2-4-6 problem.  They were given 
the following additional sentence: “The experimenter’s rule was in fact ‘any 
ascending numbers’”. Participants were assigned at random to one of four groups 
(known low-quality, unknown low-quality, known high-quality and unknown high-
quality, n = 16 in each).  
Hypothesis quality was defined in terms of how closely the hypothesis 
corresponded to the correctness of the researcher’s rule. That is, the hypothesis quality 
was based on the number of numerical properties that corresponded to the correctness 
of the researcher’s rule. For example, when the hypothesis was ‘any ascending 
numbers’ it was 100% correct, because it corresponded perfectly to the researcher’s 
rule ‘any ascending numbers’. When the hypothesis was ‘numbers ascending in twos’ 
it was half correct (50%), because ‘ascending numbers’ was one of two numerical 
properties that corresponded to the researcher’s rule . When the hypothesis was ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’ it was one third correct (33%), because ‘ascending 
numbers’  was one of three numerical properties that corresponded to the researcher’s 
rule. This measure is a crude measure, but it was the logical criterion available given 
the constraints that: (i)  the same embedded relationship between the hypothesis under 
test and the alternative hypothesis must be used; and (ii) approximately equivalent 
interval decreases in hypothesis quality should occur (see Klayman & Ha, 1989). 
See Appendix C for the instructions given to participants.  
 
Participants and procedure 
The participants were 64 members of the the general public recruited through national 
newspaper advertisements, who were paid a nominal fee (8 euro) and undergraduate 
students who participated for course credits. The 50 women and 14 men were aged 
from 15 years to 73 years, with a mean age of 35 years. No participants had taken 
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courses in the philosophy of science. Participants were tested individually and in 
small groups of up to four individuals. The experimenter read the instructions aloud to 
participants (and the participant could re-read the instructions by themselves if they 
wished). The participants were told that they could take as long as they needed to 
complete the task. Most participants took approximately fifteen minutes to complete 
the task. 
 
Results and discussion 
Number of triples  
Participants generated 343 number triples, and an average of 5.36 number triples per 
participant. Reliably more triples were generated for high-quality hypotheses than 
low-quality hypotheses (6.28 versus 4.44, Mann-Whitney U32,32 = 363, Z = -2.025, p = 
.043, two-tailed). There was no difference in the triples generated for hypotheses for 
which the quality was known or unknown (5.40 versus 5.31, Mann-Whitney U32,32 = 
463, Z = -.666, p = .505, two-tailed).  
There was no difference between the number of triples generated for the low-
quality hypothesis for which the quality was known or unknown (4.25 versus 4.63, 
Mann-Whitney U16,16 = 91.5, Z = -1.401, p = .171, two-tailed). And there was no 
difference between the number of triples generated for the high-quality hypothesis for 
which the quality was known or unknown (6.56 versus 6.00, Mann-Whitney U16,16 = 
117.5, Z = -.400, p = .696, two-tailed).  
The results show that the fewest number of  triples were not generated when 
participants tested a low-quality hypothesis, and knew they tested a low-quality 
hypothesis. This result suggests that when participants know a hypothesis is untrue, 
they test as much as when they do not know whether a hypothesis is true or not. The 
results also show that participants did not generate more test triples for high than low-
quality hypotheses, and that the highest number of triples were not generated by 
participants who tested a high-quality hypothesis and knew it was a high-quality 
hypothesis. The result suggests that when a hypothesis is high-quality, people do not 
necessarily assume the best way forward is to confirm the hypothesis as much as 
possible. 
 
Correct announcements  
Participants’ announcements of Peter’s rule as being either correct or incorrect were 
calculated for the conditions in which the rule to be discovered was unknown. The 
percentages of correct announcements were 100% for the high-quality unknown 
condition and 56% for the low-quality unknown condition, and this difference was 
reliable, chi
2
 = 10.667 (1), p = .001. As in real life where one scientist may test a 
significantly higher quality hypothesis than another scientist, participants considering 
the high quality alternative who do not know that it is the rule. They will tend to make 
the correct announcement because they have accumulated much confirmation and no 
falsification, even if they intend to falsify. When the hypothesis is low-quality more 
than half of the participants tested the hypothesis in such a way as to conclude that 
Peter’s hypothesis was not the experimenter’s rule. Falsifying evidence is available 
when a hypothesis is low-quality, and they can correctly announce that Peter’s 
hypothesis is not the experimenter’s rule.   
 
Hypothesis quality and knowledge of hypothesis quality and hypothesis testing 
Overall, more confirming triples were generated for testing high-quality (90%) than 
low-quality hypotheses (40%), and this difference was reliable,  chi
2
 = 86.087 (1), p < 
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.0001. Somewhat more falsifying triples were generated for low-quality (60%) than 
high-quality hypotheses (10%), although this difference was not reliable, chi
2
 = 
10.442 (1), p = .165 as Table 7 shows.  
 
 
Table 7 
 
Table 7: The percentage of confirming and falsifying triples generated for high and 
low quality hypothesis when quality type was known or unknown. 
 
 Known Unknown Total 
 Confirm      Falsify Confirm     Falsify  Confirm     Falsify 
 
High-quality 
 
100               0 
 
80                20 
 
90                10 
Low-quality 10               90 70                30 40                60 
Total 55               45 75                25                       65          35 
Note: The percentage of falsifying triples is presented in bold.  
 
 
The percentage of falsifying triples is the mirror image of the percentage of 
confirming triples high-quality hypotheses more confirming triples were generated by 
participants who knew they were testing a high-quality hypothesis (100%) than those 
who did not (80%), and this difference was reliable, chi
2
 = 4.308 (1), p = .038. More 
falsifying triples were generated by participants who did not know they were testing a 
high-quality hypothesis (20%) than those who did know (0%), and this difference was 
reliable chi
2
 = 21.895 (1), p < .01, (although this p value may be elevated because 
zero cases were present in all cells for the known condition). The result suggests that 
even when a hypothesis corresponds to a true state of affairs, participants cannot be 
certain that it does and so they will still attempt to falsify the high-quality hypothesis 
in the unknown condition. In this way the knowledge that the hypothesis under test is 
a good one (by telling participants what the experimenter’s rule is) affects confirming 
and falsifying in addition to the effect of hypothesis quality.  
For low-quality hypotheses more confirming triples were generated by 
participants who did not know they were testing a low-quality hypothesis (70%) than 
participants who did know (10%), and this difference was reliable chi
2
 = 34.322 (1), p 
< .0001. Critically, participants who knew they were testing a low-quality hypothesis 
falsified more often (90%) than those who did not know (30%), and this difference 
was reliable, chi
2
 = 18.325 (1), p < .0001. This result does not corroborate the theory 
that people cannot make sense of falsification, especially when they consider better 
alternative hypotheses (Poletiek, 1996; 2001). Participants found it possible to 
intentionally generate falsifying tests in order to show that Peter’s low-quality 
hypothesis was untrue. 
 
Four types of hypothesis tests 
When participants tested Peter’s low-quality hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending in 
twos’ and they knew that the experimenter’s rule was ‘any ascending numbers’, they 
generated the critical negative falsifying test 90% of the time as Table _ shows. All 
falsifying triples were negative falsifying triples and there were no positive falsifying 
triples. Every participant in this condition generated at least one negative falsifying 
test and announced that Peter should know from the evidence they gathered that his 
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hypothesis is incorrect. Participants found it possible to consistently falsify (Poletiek, 
1996), even though the relationship between the hypothesis and the experimenter’s 
rule required this difficult type of falsifying test (Klayman & Ha, 1987).  
 
 
Table 8 
 
Table 8: Percentages of confirming and falsifying positive and negative test types  
      generated in Experiment 1. 
 
  Low-quality  High-
quality 
 
  Known 
 
Unknown Known Unknown 
 
Confirming 
     
 Positive   6 61 86 72                    
 Negative   4   9 14   8 
      
Falsifying Positive   0   8   0 14 
 Negative 90 22   0   6 
      
      
 
Negative falsifying triples were generated more often by participants who 
knew they were testing a low-quality hypothesis (90%) than in any other condition, 
that is, when they did not know they were testing a low-quality hypothesis (22%), 
when they tested a high-quality hypothesis and did not know it was high-quality (6%), 
or when they tested a high-quality hypothesis and did know it was high-quality (0%), 
chi
2
 = 46.938 (21), p = .0005. Overall more negative falsifying tests were generated 
for low-quality hypotheses (56%) than for high-quality hypotheses (3%), chi
2
 = 
24.737 (7), p = .0005. Overall the generation of negative falsifying tests did not differ 
between conditions where the quality of the hypothesis was known (45%) and when it 
was unknown (14%), chi
2
 = 8.18 (7), p = .159.  
Even participants who tested Peter’s low-quality hypothesis and did not know 
it was low-quality generated more negative falsifying tests (22%) than is usual in the 
2-4-6 task. For example, 6% of tests were negative falsifying tests in Poletiek’s 
falsifying condition (1996).   As noted earlier in experiment 1 simply testing someone 
else’s hypothesis helps people to falsify using negative tests (32%) more often than is 
standard in the 2-4-6 literature. 
Positive confirming triples were generated less often by participants who 
tested a low-quality hypothesis and did know it was low-quality (6%), compared to 
when participants knew they were testing a high-quality hypothesis (86%), or when 
they did not know they were testing a high-quality hypothesis (72%), or when they 
tested a low-quality hypothesis and did not know it was low-quality (61%), chi
2
 = 
63.161 (33), p = .0005. Overall reliably more positive confirming tests were reliably 
generated for high-quality hypotheses (79%) than for low-quality hypotheses (34%), 
chi
2
 = 32.732 (11), p = .0005. Overall the generation of positive confirming tests did 
not differ between conditions where the quality of the hypothesis was known (46%) 
andwhen it was unknown (67%), chi
2
 = 11.34 (11), p = .208. (There were too few 
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negative confirming and positive falsifying tests in the data set to complete an 
objective chi-square analysis (Hollander & Wolfe, 1999)). 
This result indicates that alternative hypotheses play a role in successful 
hypothesis falsification. One important implication that can be drawn from this 
finding is that the properties of the hypothesis which are generated, such as the quality 
of the hypothesis, cannot by themselves explain the hypothesis testing strategies 
people adopt. Other factors, such as the quality of the alternative hypothesis 
considered alongside the initial hypothesis may help explain the hypothesis testing 
strategies people adopt. This result does not corroborate the view that people do not 
know when a negative test is wise and when it is not (Klayman & Ha, 1987).
 However, the result presents a situation in which some may argue that it is 
obvious that people can intentionally falsify. The experiment suggests that this 
situation is a good place to start a detailed analysis of the factors that may affect 
intentional falsification. 
The sentence ‘…you know that the experimenter’s rule is any ascending numbers’ 
introduces several factors which may explain the resulting high levels of hypothesis 
falsification. First, participants are provided with an alternative hypothesis to consider 
alongside the initial hypothesis. This alternative hypothesis is not only the correct rule 
(‘any ascending numbers’) but is higher quality than the hypothesis under test (‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’). Second, the sentence provides participants with the 
knowledge that Peter’s hypothesis is untrue, because participants are told that the 
alternative (‘any ascending numbers’) is in fact the experimenter’s rule. In the next 
experiment the role each one of these factors may play in hypothesis falsification is 
examined. The prediction that the knowledge of hypothesis quality affects hypothesis 
falsification was made, and whether the alternative hypothesis needs to be very high-
quality (the actual experimenter’s rule) in order for participants to falsify Peter’s 
hypothesis was tested.   
 
   
Experiment 4 
The aim of this experiment was to determine what properties of an alternative 
hypothesis facilitate high levels of negative falsifying tests.  In sum it was predicted 
that alternative hypotheses, particularly higher quality alternatives, facilitate the 
generation of negative falsifying tests and hence rule discovery. 
 
Method 
Materials and design 
Participants were randomly assigned to four conditions (three experimental conditions 
and one control condition, n = 16 in each). In each condition they were given a low-
quality hypothesis belonging to the imaginary participant Peter: ‘even numbers 
ascending in twos’. Participants were then given another piece of information in the 
form of an alternative hypothesis. In the three experimental conditions participants 
were given one of three alternative hypotheses (high, medium and low-quality) to 
consider alongside the initial hypothesis that belonged to Peter. In the control 
condition they were given the alternative: ‘in fact you know the experimenter’s rule is 
‘any ascending numbers’ (this is the replication of the known low-quality condition in 
Experiment 1). In the first experimental condition (high-quality alternative) 
participants were given a high-quality alternative hypothesis that was the 
experimenter’s rule, but they did not know it: ‘you know that another participant 
called James hypothesised that the experimenter’s rule was any ascending numbers’. 
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In the second experimental condition (medium quality alternative) participants were 
given the medium quality alternative that was not the experimenter’s rule but which 
was higher quality than Peter’s hypothesis: ‘you know that another participant called 
James hypothesized that the experimenter’s rule was numbers ascending in twos’. In 
the third experimental condition (low-quality alternative) they were given a low-
quality alternative that was lower quality than Peter’s hypothesis: ‘you know that 
another participant called James hypothesized that the experimenter’s rule was even 
numbers ascending in twos that end in the digits 2,4,6’ (adapted from Klayman & Ha, 
1989). The instructions for the second experimental condition are given below to 
illustrate (see Appendix E for the instructions given to participants). 
 
Participants and procedure 
Forty eight participants completed the task (one was excluded because she said she 
was familiar with the task). Most participants were undergraduate students and some 
were individuals from the general population. The age of the participants ranged from 
16 to 49 years. The mean age was 22 years, and there were 33 women and 14 men 
who took part. No participants had taken courses in the philosophy of science. 
 
Results and discussion 
Number of triples 
A total of 245 triples was generated with a mean of 3.83 triples per participant. A 
mean of 3.38 triples was generated in the control condition when participants knew 
the alternative ‘any ascending numbers’ was the experimenter’s rule. A mean of 4.06 
triples was generated in the high-quality alternative condition when participants 
considered the alternative ‘any ascending numbers’. A mean of 4.31 triples was 
generated in the medium quality alternative condition when participants considered 
the alternative ‘numbers ascending in twos’. A mean of 3.56 triples was generated in 
the low-quality alternative condition when participants considered the alternative 
‘even numbers ascending in twos’.  Somewhat fewer triples were generated by 
participants in the control condition who knew that ‘any ascending numbers’ was the 
experimenter’s rule (M = 3.38) than participants in the high-quality alternative 
condition who did not know it was the experimenter’s rule (M = 4.06), but this 
difference was not reliable (Mann-Whitney16,16 = 96.5, Z = -1.204, p = .118). 
Somewhat fewer triples were generated in the control condition (M = 3.38) than in the 
medium quality alternative condition (M = 4.31), and but this difference was not 
significant (Mann-Whitney16,16 U = 87.5, Z = -1.563, p = .064, two-tailed). There was 
little difference in the mean number of triples generated in the control condition (M = 
3.38) and in the low-quality alternative condition (M = 3.56), and the difference was 
not reliable (Mann-Whitney16,16 U = 114.00, Z = -.536, p = .308). There was no 
difference for the number of triples generated in the high-quality alternative condition 
(M = 4.06) and in the medium quality alternative condition (M = 4.31, Mann-
Whitney16,16 U = 111.00, Z = -.658, p = .268). There was a marginal difference in the 
number of triples generated for the medium quality alternative condition (M = 4.31) 
and in the low-quality alternative condition (M = 3.56, Mann-Whitney16,16 U = 88.5, Z 
= -1.522, p = .069). These results imply that the quality of the alternative hypothesis 
may sometimes affect the number of tests participants generated when testing a low-
quality hypothesis. There was a small indication that participants could have a 
tendency to test fewer triples in the control condition because they are sure that 
Peter’s hypothesis is untrue and that their test falsifies his hypothesis.. This result 
replicates the same finding reported in Experiment 1. And there was a small 
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indication that participants could have a tendency to test fewer triples in the low-
quality alternative condition than in the other experimental conditions, perhaps 
because the consideration of an alternative that is even lower quality than their 
hypothesis may constrain their ability to generate other possible test triples or 
alternatives. Participants test more when the alternative hypothesis is higher quality 
than the hypothesis under test and they do not know that the alternative is higher 
quality, perhaps indicating that there is a tendency to test more once a falsification is 
achieved.  
 
Correct announcements and rule discovery 
The experiment predicted that as the quality of the alternative hypothesis decreased 
the number of correct announcements would decrease, that is,  the number of 
participants who would announce that Peter’s low-quality hypothesis ‘even numbers 
ascending in twos’ was incorrect would decrease.5 The alternative hypothesis may 
present the participant with an explicit set of possibilities from which to generate 
falsifying tests. If participants are using the alternative hypothesis to generate test 
triples such as 5-11-22 when they consider the alternative hypothesis ‘any ascending 
numbers’ they cannot falsify Peter’s hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ 
when they receive a ‘yes’ from the experimenter, but they may conclude that the 
alternative hypothesis is necessarily the experimenter’s rule.  
Participants in the high-quality alternative condition announced that Peter’s 
hypothesis was not the rule almost as often (81%) as participants in the medium 
quality condition (94%), but less often when they were presented with the low-quality 
alternative hypothesis (69%). This difference was not significant, chi
2
 = 3.282 (2), p = 
.097, two tailed). Participants discovered what the experimenter’s rule was more often 
in the high-quality alternative condition (50%) and in the medium quality alternative 
condition (44%), than in the low-quality alternative condition (12%, chi
2
 = 5.647 (2), 
p = .03). 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Table 9: The percentages of participants who discovered the experimenter’s rule. 
 High-quality  Medium quality Low-quality 
 
Rule discovered 
 
 
50 
 
 
44 
 
12 
 
 
The result implies that even when one of the hypotheses under consideration is 
correct participants may not always discover that it is correct (50%). Moreover, even 
when participants consider a medium quality alternative hypothesis they can 
sometimes discover the rule (44%). Participants who considered a lower quality 
alternative hypothesis rarely discovered the rule (12%). The implication is that it is 
not enough to consider two alternative hypotheses to discover the rule; discovery may 
depend on considering at least one good quality hypothesis (e.g., Tweney et al., 1980).  
 
                                                 
5
 The control condition is not relevant to this section because participants know what the 
experimenter’s rule is. We compare the three experimental conditions only. 
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Alternative hypothesis quality and hypothesis testing 
The experiment predicted that participants would falsify more when the alternative 
hypothesis was higher quality, and that as the alternative decreased in quality 
participants would confirm more. Although participants confirmed somewhat more in 
the low-quality condition (67%), compared to the medium quality condition (52%) 
and in the high-quality condition (49%), the differences were not reliable, chi
2
 = 
13.017 (12), p = .184. As predicted participants falsified more in the high-quality 
condition (51%), and in the medium quality condition (48%), than in the low-quality 
condition (33%), chi
2
 = 20.323 (10), p = .013. The results imply that as the quality of 
the alternative hypothesis decreases the amount of falsification decreases. High-
quality alternative hypotheses facilitate falsification of low-quality hypotheses. 
 
Four types of hypothesis tests 
Participants falsified reliably more often with negative falsifying tests in the high-
quality condition (42%), and in the medium quality condition (48%), than in the low-
quality condition (23%), chi
2
 = 22.167 (10), p = .007, as Table 2.7 shows. Participants  
confirmed somewhat more often with positive confirming tests in the low-quality 
condition (44%), than in the medium quality condition (20%), or in the high-quality 
condition (23%), but this difference was not reliable, chi
2
 = 7.725 (10), p = .328. 
 A similar amount of negative confirming was observed in the high-quality 
condition (26%), as in the medium quality condition (32%), and in the low-quality 
condition (23%), chi
2
 = 6.686 (10), p = .378. There were too few positive falsifying 
tests in the data set to justify a statistical analysis (See Siegel and Castellen, 1994). 
The results imply that the quality of the alternative hypothesis does not have a strong 
affect on the amount of negative falsifying triples. Regardless of the quality of the 
alternative hypothesis, negative falsifying tests were generated. 
 
 
Knowledge of alternative hypothesis quality 
Participants generated falsifying tests when they knew the alternative hypothesis was 
the experimenter’s rule (61%) and when they did not know (51%), and this difference 
was not reliable, chi
2
 = 7.244 (6), p = .15. The result that the majority (61%) of the 
tests were falsifying when participants knew the alternative was the experimenter’s 
rule replicates our finding in Experiment 1, although the effect in this experiment was 
not as large.  
Participants confirmed somewhat less often when they knew the alternative 
hypothesis was the experimenter’s rule (39%) than when they did not know (49%), 
but this was not reliable, chi
2
 = 3.352 (5), p = .323. Negative falsifying tests were 
generated somewhat more often when participants knew the alternative was the 
experimenter’s rule (61%) than when they did not (42%), but this difference was not 
reliable, chi
2
 = 6.819 (6), p = .169. Positive confirming tests were generated as often 
when participants knew the alternative was the experimenter’s rule (33%) than when 
they did not know (23%), chi
2
 = .400, (4), p = .491. More negative confirming tests 
were generated when participants did not know the alternative was the experimenter’s 
rule (26%) than when they did know (6%), and this difference was marginally 
reliable, chi
2
 = 7.133 (4), p = .065. The knowledge that the alternative hypothesis is 
the experimenter’s rule has a small effect on hypothesis testing, but the consideration 
of a higher quality alternative hypothesis may be the clearest predictor that people will 
falsify a low-quality hypothesis.  
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The results do not corroborate the view that falsification is impossible; people can 
falsify when they consider a higher quality alternative hypothesis (Poletiek, 1996). 
However, the higher quality alternative may have given participants information that 
made relationship between Peter’s hypothesis and the truth explicit (Klayman & Ha, 
1987). The next experiment examines whether the alternative needs to be explicit and 
shown to embed Peter’s hypothesis in order for participants to falsify.  
 
 
Experiment 5 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate whether hypothesis falsification is 
facilitated by presenting participants with an alternative explicit set of possibilities 
from which to generate the negative falsifying tests. Our previous experiments found 
that falsification was facilitated by the consideration of an alternative hypothesis, but 
each alternative hypothesis stated explicit numerical properties, such as ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’ from which a negative test triple such as 3-5-7 could be 
generated. This experiment examines whether people can generate negative falsifying 
tests when they consider a non-explicit hypothesis such as ‘something else’. Counter 
to Klayman and Ha (1987; 1989) who suggest that people may be able to generate 
negative tests in the standard 2-4-6 task when the relationship is made explicit to 
them, we predict that the consideration of a non-explicit alternative hypothesis 
prompts people to generate their own alternatives from which to generate negative 
falsifying triples.  
 
Method 
Materials and design 
Participants were randomly assigned to three conditions (n = 16 in each). In each 
condition they were given a low-quality hypothesis belonging to the imaginary 
participant Peter: ‘even numbers ascending in twos’. In the first condition they were 
given an explicit alternative hypothesis: ‘Another participant called James 
hypothesised that the experimenter’s rule was any ascending numbers’. In the second 
condition they were given a non-explicit alternative: ‘Another participant called 
James hypothesised that the experimenter’s rule was something else’. In the third 
condition they were given no alternative at all. See Appendix F for the instructions 
given to participants. 
 
Participants and procedure 
Forty eight participants completed the task. They were undergraduate students who 
gained course credit for their participation. Their age ranged from 17 to 49 years and 
the mean age was 21 years. There were 33 women and 15 men who took part. No 
participants had taken courses in the philosophy of science. The recording sheet and 
procedure were the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Results and discussion  
Number of triples 
A total of 222 triples were generated. A mean number of 4.63 triples were generated 
per participant. There was no difference in the number of triples generated when the 
alternative was explicit (M = 4.75) and non-explicit (M = 4.81, Mann-Whitney16,16 U 
= 122.5, Z = -.210, p = .417). There was no difference in the number of triples 
generated when the alternative was non-explicit (M = 4.81) andwhen there was no 
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alternative (M = 4.31, Mann-Whitney16,16 U = 109, Z = -.7224, p = .469, two-tailed). 
And there was no difference in the number of triples generated when the alternative 
was explicit (M = 4.75) andwhen there was no alternative (M = 4.31, Mann-
Whitney16,16 U = 106, Z = -.840, p = .401, two-tailed). The result implies that neither 
the consideration of nor the explicitness of an alternative hypothesis, affects how 
much people test their hypothesis. 
 
Correct announcements and rule discovery 
Participants announced correctly that Peter’s low-quality hypothesis ‘even numbers 
ascending in twos’ was not the experimenter’s rule somewhat less often when they 
were presented with the explicit alternative (69%), than the non-explicit alternative 
(81%), or no alternative (81%), but this difference was not reliable (chi
2
 = 0.943 (2), p 
= 0.312). The rate of correctly announcing that Peter’s hypothesis is not the 
experimenter’s rule appears to be elevated in this experiment compared to the 
previous experiment. Nonetheless the first condition (50% discovered the rule) 
replicates the result of the same condition in Experiment 2 (50% also discovered the 
rule), suggesting there were no new extraneous variables.  
Participants in this experiment were asked what they thought the 
experimenter’s rule was once they announced Peter’s low-quality hypothesis ‘even 
numbers in twos’ was incorrect.  The rate of rule discovery was highest when 
participants considered the explicit alternative ‘any ascending numbers’ (50%), than 
the non-explicit alternative ‘something else’ (31%), or when there was no alternative 
(19%), and this difference was reliable (chi
2
 = 5.101 (2), p =  .039).  
The results suggest that the discovery of the rule appears to depend on the 
consideration of an explicit high-quality alternative hypothesis. Falsification and the 
consideration of an alternative that is both explicit and high-quality may go hand in 
hand to facilitate rational hypothesis testing (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972; Kuhn, 
1996).  
 
Confirming and falsifying 
More confirming triples were generated when the alternative was explicit (57%), than 
when it was the non-explicit (47%), or when there was no alternative (46%), but this 
difference was not significant (chi
2
 = 28.374 (16), p = .058). 
There was no difference in the amount of falsifying triples generated when the 
alternative was explicit (43%), than  non-explicit (53%), and when there was no 
alternative (54%), (chi
2
 = 10.044 (16), p = .216). It is not clear from this result if the 
consideration of explicit and non-explicit alternatives help people to falsify.  
Falsifying was found in each condition even when there was no alternative. As noted 
earlier, it is possible that simply considering someone else’s hypothesis helps a 
participant to falsify. 
 
Four types of hypothesis tests 
More positive confirming tests were generated when the alternative was explicit 
(37%), than when it was non-explicit (22%), or when there was no alternative at all 
(27%), but this was not reliable, chi
2
 = 11.379 (12), p =  .249. There was no difference 
in the amount of negative confirming tests generated when the alternative was explicit 
(20%), than when it was non-explicit (25%), than when there was no alternative 
(19%), chi
2
 = 9.128 (8), p = .166). 
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Table 10 
Table 10:     The percentages of positive and negative confirming and falsifying 
triples generated when the alternative hypothesis was explicit, non-explicit,  and when 
there was no alternative. 
     
  Explicit Non-explicit No alternative 
 
 
Confirming 
    
 Positive      37 22     27 
 Negative      20 25     19 
     
Falsifying Positive        8   8     12 
 Negative      35 45     42 
     
 
 
There was no difference in the amount of positive falsifying tests generated when the 
alternative was explicit (8%), than when it was non-explicit (8%), or when there was 
no alternative (12%, the number of cases was not large enough to carry out a reliable 
chi-square test). There was no difference in the amount of negative falsifying tests 
generated when the alternative was explicit (35%), than when the alternative was not 
explicit (45%), or when there was no alternative (42%, chi
2
 = 12.875 (14), p = .268). 
The results are important not only because they replicate the results of our earlier 
experiments to show that negative falsifying is possible more often than the literature 
has ever shown, but they imply that the consideration of an alternative need not 
necessarily be explicit in order to falsify using a negative falsifying test.  
 
General Discussion 
The experiments revealed that people find it possible to falsify an incorrect hypothesis 
that is typical of the standard 2-4-6 task. The introduction of an imaginary participant 
to the 2-4-6 task led to several novel and important findings for hypothesis testing. 
Experiment 1 reported the novel result that participants find it possible to generate the 
negative tests that have the potential to lead to falsification of a hypothesis. 
Participants could consistently generate negative tests of a hypothesis that belonged to 
someone else rather than their own equally untrue hypothesis in the 2-4-6 task. While 
the negative tests of the imaginary participant’s hypothesis in Experiment 1 were not 
significantly intended to falsify there were many more intentionally falsifying 
instances than has previously been shown in the literature (e.g., Poletiek, 1996).  
Experiment 2 showed the novel result that participants could this time consistently 
generate negative tests of their own hypothesis when they imagined an opponent 
hypothesis tester who was also trying to discover the rule. But participants tended 
only to see how these negative tests had the potential to confirm their hypotheses. 
They could not anticipate how these negative tests could show them to be wrong.  
One explanation is that considering an Imaginary Participant and an Imaginary 
Opponent prompt the consideration of instances outside of what is presently being 
considered such as alternative hypotheses. Experiment 3 showed that participants 
intentionally falsified Peter’s untrue hypothesis with negative tests when they 
considered an alternative hypothesis that made the researcher’s rule explicit. 
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Participants consistently overcame their tendency to test a hypothesis with positive 
tests when it was more accurate to test with negative tests and they predicted that 
these negative tests would lead to falsification.  
A number of different factors were separated out to examine what facilitate the 
falsification observed. Experiment 4 found that participants did not necessarily need 
to know that the alternative was the experimenter’s rule in order to falsify. They 
intentionally falsified Peter’s hypothesis as often when they considered the 
experimenter’s rule, and did not know it was the experimenter’s rule, as when they 
did know. They also falsified as often when the alternative was higher quality than 
Peter’s hypothesis, even though it was not as high in quality as the experimenter’s 
rule. Participants discovered the rule as often when the alternative was higher quality, 
regardless of whether it was the experimenter’s rule or not. When the alternative was 
lower quality than Peter’s hypothesis it led to falsification, but participants were not 
able to use this falsification to discover the experimenter’s rule. The major implication 
of this result is that falsification of a hypothesis can be facilitated by the consideration 
of higher and lower quality alternative hypotheses, but falsification in light of a higher 
quality alternative leads to the discovery of the rule. 
 Experiment 5 produced the novel result that participants intentionally falsified 
as often when the alternative was explicit and non-explicit, and when there was no 
alternative. But participants reliably discovered the rule more often when the 
alternative was explicit than non-explicit, and than when there was no alternative at 
all. The major implication of this finding is that falsification is sufficient to announce 
that a hypothesis is untrue, but perhaps an explicit alternative hypothesis that explains 
the falsifying result is necessary for truth discovery.  
The results do not corroborate the mathematical relationship theory that asserts 
participants have a tendency to engage in a positive test strategy in the hypothesis 
testing situations they encounter (Klayman & Ha, 1987). In our experiments 
participants knew when it was accurate to test a hypothesis with a negative test; when 
they considered an alternative hypothesis they could often reliably generate negative 
tests and they reliably expected them to falsify (Klayman & Ha, 1987).  The 
prediction that participants need to know what the mathematical relationship between 
the hypothesis and the truth is in order to generate negative tests was not supported by 
our results. Participants generated negative tests and expected these tests to falsify 
when they considered a non-explicit hypothesis telling them nothing about what the 
relationship between the hypothesis and the rule was (Klayman & Ha, 1989). 
The results also do not corroborate the prediction that participants find 
falsification impossible; participants not only generated negative tests but they 
intended these negative tests to falsify. They showed that they understood the 
implications of their test choice by predicting that Peter would know from their 
negative falsifying tests that his hypothesis was incorrect (Poletiek, 1996).  
The consideration of a non-explicit alternative could not have made the 
mathematical relationship between the hypothesis under test and the truth directly 
explicit to participants. Yet participants generated negative falsifying tests and 
intended them to falsify when they considered a non-explicit alternative hypothesis 
more often than has been usual in the hypothesis testing literature (for a review see 
Poletiek, 2001). Counter to alternative hypotheses accounts based on the premise of 
considering two alternative explicit hypotheses, the non- explicit alternative did not 
hamper the generation of falsifying tests, or negative falsifying triples (Oaksford & 
Chater, 1994). Counter to the mathematical relationship theory participants may be 
able to make the relationship explicit for themselves simple by thinking that the truth 
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is something other than what they presently consider (Klayman & Ha, 1987; 1989). 
Although the generation of negative falsifying tests did not depend on the 
consideration of an explicit alternative, it is possible that participants subsequently 
fleshed out the non-explicit alternative to generate their own explicit alternative (e.g., 
Byrne, 2005).  Furthermore the theoretical view that participants find it difficult to 
intentionally falsify a low-quality hypothesis because there is no new information 
available to them, cannot offer a complete explanation either (Poletiek, 1996; 2001). 
A non-explicit hypothesis does not give participants new information, but it may 
encourage them to search for new evidence by either generating their own negative 
tests or alternative hypothesis.  The results imply that falsification and the 
consideration of alternative hypotheses that are higher quality than the hypothesis 
under test, may go hand in hand in discovering the truth in hypothesis testing (Wason 
& Johnson-Laird, 1972). The falsifying test is only any good if it leads to the 
endorsement of an explicit alternative that is higher quality than the quality of the 
hypothesis under test. For example, in scientific reasoning a theory is sometimes 
falsified, but unless there is an explicit alternative theory to explain the falsifying 
result, the falsification remains an anomaly until such a time as a new theory is 
generated (see Kuhn, 1993).  
 
Implications for theories of reasoning 
Our results have important implications for theories of reasoning. The results on 
falsification are important to the consideration of negative information in reasoning, 
and the results on the consideration of alternative hypotheses are important for 
understanding the consideration of alternatives in reasoning in general.  
Hypothesis falsification implies that people can think about negative instances 
(e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987; Kareev & Halberstadt, 1993; Vallee-Tourangeau et al., 
1995). Consider when someone is asked to think about the statement ‘If Sharon is in 
Spain, then Justina is in Holland’, and they encounter a piece of information that is 
inconsistent with this statement such as ‘Justina is not in Holland’, they can deduce 
that ‘Sharon is not in Spain’. This type of inference is called Modus Tollens and it has 
been investigated extensively in the literature on deductive reasoning (e.g., Byrne, 
1989; Byrne & Tasso, 1994), and is logically equivalent to hypothesis falsification 
(e.g., Popper, 1959; Klayman & Ha, 1987).  
To consider the inference people may construct a counterexample that is a 
possibility which is inconsistent with the possibility currently under consideration. A 
counterexample may be similar to a refutation of a theory in science (Kuhn, 1993). 
Little is known about how people search for counterexamples when they reason (e.g., 
Byrne, Espino, & Santamaria, 1999), and the results of our experiments in which 
people imagine another participant or opponent show that it may be important to 
further investigate the ecologically valid circumstances which prompt people to 
explicitly mentally represent what is being reasoned about as fully as possible in order 
to discover counterexamples. Otherwise deductive errors could be made, such as 
concluding ‘nothing follows’ when you are told ‘Justina is not in Holland’ (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).  
The experimental analysis in the imaginary participant 2-4-6 task showed that 
falsification by itself could not be predicted by how explicit the alternative hypothesis 
was. Yet the representation of an alternative hypothesis as explicit was critical in the 
use of falsification to abandon an untrue hypothesis. This condition may parallel 
scientific reasoning that tends not to abandon a falsified theory unless a viable 
alternative theory presents a better explanation (e.g., Kuhn, 1993), or labels 
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falsification as an anomaly until a better alternative theory is generated (e.g., 
Koslowski, 1996).  
 
Implications for hypothesis testing 
The results have several implications for current theories of hypothesis testing. First, 
the effect of competition in hypothesis testing corroborates the separation of 
falsification into falsifying one’s own hypothesis, and falsifying someone else’s 
hypotheses (Poletiek, 2005).  
It is possible that when the testing of a hypothesis leads to an encounter with 
evidence to prove that the hypothesis is false, it may lead to the generation of new 
knowledge (Popper, 1963). In scientific terms a falsification of theory is termed a 
refutation (Kuhn, 1993). When theories are refuted either an alternative theory which 
explains the result is accepted as superior, or an alternative theory is developed which 
can explain the falsifying result (e.g., Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972; Kuhn, 1993). A 
theory is revised to incorporate the new result rather than abandoned altogether 
(Howson & Urbach, 1993; Klayman & Ha, 1989; Kowslowki, 1996), or occasionally 
the refutation is labelled as an anomaly until a viable alternative theory is generated 
(Kuhn, 1993; Koslowski, 1996). 
Refutations are generated by rival theorists (e.g., Mitroff, 1974; Kuhn, 1993), 
and to safeguard against many refutations being labelled anomalies by scientists who 
disagree with one another it is important to test hypotheses with specific alternatives 
in mind (e.g, Platt, 1964). For example, successful hypothesis testers who use 
falsification to overcome hypotheses which are untrue, consider at least one 
alternative hypothesis in rule discovery tasks (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1989).  Identifying 
falsifying evidence indicates what is wrong with a hypothesis or theory (e.g, 
Fugelsang et al., 2004). Falsification drives hypothesis revision because it hints at 
what should be incorporated into the hypothesis. When we encounter inconsistent 
evidence relevant to a current state of knowledge we may update our knowledge by 
revising it to include the new piece of information (e.g., Gardenfors, 1988; Harman, 
1986). Falsification is possible in competitive contexts which promote the 
consideration of alternative hypotheses. Thus falsification ensures that theories which 
have outlived their usefulness are either improved or abandoned in favour of theories 
which offer better explanations (Popper, 1963).  
The research leads to an important future question. How can the competition 
and the consideration of alternative hypotheses make it possible for people to seek out 
negative evidence to challenge their own hypotheses which they believe to be true 
(Popper, 1959; Wason, 1960)? Trying to confirm again what we already believe can 
lead to the maintenance of incorrect ideas, such as those concerned with prejudiced 
stereotyping (e.g., Snyder & Swan; 1978). Consider prejudiced hypotheses in which 
the prejudice tends to be embedded within the truth identical to the standard 2-4-6 
context. For example, a prejudice about an ethnic minority, in which there is a 
collection of a small set of instances with a negative connotation. If we consider a 
contemporary example such as someone in Northern Ireland held the prejudiced belief 
that all Catholics were involved in paramilitary activities they may cite cases which 
are consistent (positive instances) with this belief, such as a person with a criminal 
record for paramilitary activity who was also Catholic, and avoid any inconsistent 
instances (negative instances) which exist outside of their collection of confirming 
evidence (Mallie, 2001). But one falsifying case can prove that this prejudiced belief 
is false. The standard version of the 2-4-6 task, when the participant’s hypothesis is 
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embedded within the true rule, is analogically equivalent to this prejudiced belief 
(Wason, 1960).   
When people compete with an opponent hypothesis tester the competition may 
help them create other salient alternative possibilities, or the competition may 
facilitate the need to use negation to falsify an opponent’s hypothesis.  
People tend to think of few possibilities in their reasoning because their 
working memory is limited (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). When people test 
hypotheses they often represent only one hypothesis at a time in working memory 
(Mynatt, Doherty, & Dragan, 1993), but when they compete with an opponent 
hypothesis tester they may represent two possibilities; their own hypothesis and the 
opponent’s hypothesis. These possibilities may not necessarily correspond to false 
possibilities, but two possibilities that may be true (e.g., Tweney et al., 1980; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Competitive hypothesis testing may provide a forum 
in which people can consider two possibilities, their own hypothesis and their 
opponent’s hypothesis, and the difficulty of representing two possibilities by oneself 
and falsifying one’s own hypothesis may be slightly less. Third, competition may 
help participants to be better at making possible alternative hypotheses explicit for 
themselves in their mental representations of hypotheses, and the alternative set of 
possibilities may help them to generate negative falsifying test triples. Perhaps with 
competition participants may understand that there are alternative hypotheses that an 
opponent hypothesis tester may be considering. Even though the alternatives 
belonging to an opponent are non-explicit, the competition may prompt participants to 
flesh out these properties to consider what the opponent’s alternatives might be.  
 In conclusion, the Imaginary Participant experiments in this paper show how 
reasoning with falsification facilitates the comparison of internal thoughts with 
external facts allowing us to interact with the world in a way that reflects reality. Thus 
falsification may present us with one of the cornerstones of enlightened thinking 
associated not only with scientific progress, but to the deep insights associated with 
educational excellence, and a free thinking society that asks questions and challenges 
prejudices. 
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Appendices: 
 
Appendix A: Instructions used in experiment 1  
 
“In a previous study investigating human thinking a participant called Peter 
was asked to discover a rule a researcher had in mind that the number sequence 2,4,6 
conforms to. Peter hypothesised that the experimenter’s rule was: “even numbers 
ascending in twos”.  
Your aim is to go about testing if Peter’s rule “even numbers ascending in twos” is 
the experimenter’s rule. You are to do this by writing down other number sequences 
with sets of three numbers. You will then be informed if these number sequences 
conform or do not conform to the rule the researcher has in mind.  
You should try to go about testing if Peter’s rule “even numbers ascending in 
twos” is the rule the researcher has in mind by citing as few number sequences as you 
can. Please note that you have three pages on which to test your number sequences if 
you need to. When you feel highly confident that you have discovered if Peter’s rule 
is the experimenter’s rule, and not before, you are to write down “Peter’s rule is the 
experimenter’s rule” or “Peter’s rule is not the experimenter’s rule”. You are to write 
this under your most recent number sequence. The experimenter will then write 
whether or not you are correct beside your announcement. 
The words ‘your’ and ‘you’ replaced the words ‘Peter’s’ and ‘Peter’ respectively 
for the condition where the hypothesis belonged to the participant themselves.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Instructions used in Experiment 2 
 
“In a previous study investigating human thinking you were a participant who 
was asked to discover a rule a researcher had in mind that the number sequence 2,4,6 
conforms to. You hypothesised that the experimenter’s rule was: “even numbers 
ascending in twos”.  
Your aim is to go about testing if your rule “even numbers ascending in twos” 
is the experimenter’s rule. However, an opponent called Peter is also testing “even 
numbers ascending in twos”. You must discover if “even numbers ascending in twos” 
is the experimenter’s rule before he does.  
You are to do this by writing down other number sequences with sets of three 
numbers. You will then be informed if these number sequences conform or do not 
conform to the rule the researcher has in mind. Please remember your aim is 
specifically to test if your original rule “even numbers ascending in twos” is the 
experimenter’s rule, and not to test any new ideas of your own that you think the 
experimenter’s rule might be. 
Please note that you have three pages on which to test your number sequences 
if you need to. When you feel highly confident that you have discovered if your rule is 
the experimenter’s rule, and not before, you are to write down “My rule is the 
experimenter’s rule” or “My rule is not the experimenter’s rule”. You are to write this 
under your most recent number sequence. The experimenter will then write whether 
or not you are correct beside your announcement.” 
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Appendix C: Instructions used in experiment 3 
 
“In a previous study investigating human thinking a participant called Peter was 
asked to discover a rule a researcher had in mind that the number sequence 2,4,6 
conforms to. Peter hypothesised that the experimenter’s rule was: ‘even numbers 
ascending in twos’. The experimenter’s rule is in fact ‘ascending numbers’.  
Your aim is to go about testing Peter’s rule ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ in a 
way you think would help him to discover if his rule is the experimenter’s rule. You 
are to do this by writing down other number sequences with sets of three numbers. 
You will then be informed if they conform or do not conform to the rule the 
researcher has in mind.  
You should try to go about testing Peter’s rule ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ 
in a way that would help him discover that his rule is not the experimenter’s rule by 
citing as few number sequences as you can. Please note that you have three pages on 
which to test your number sequences if you need to.  
When you feel highly confident that you have helped Peter discover that his rule is 
not the experimenter’s rule, and not before, you are to write down “Peter now knows 
his rule is not the experimenter’s rule”. You are to write this under your most recent 
number sequence. The researcher will then write whether or not you are correct beside 
your announcement.” 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Instructions used in experiment 4 
 
“In a previous study investigating human thinking a participant called Peter was 
asked to discover a rule a researcher had in mind that the number sequence 2,4,6 
conforms to. Peter hypothesised that the experimenter’s rule was: ‘even numbers 
ascending in twos’. You know that another participant called James hypothesised that 
the experimenter’s rule was ‘numbers ascending in twos’. 
Your aim is to go about testing Peter’s rule ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ in a 
way you think would help him to discover if his rule is the experimenter’s rule. You 
are to do this by writing down other number sequences with sets of three numbers. 
You will then be informed if they conform or do not conform to the rule the 
researcher has in mind.  
You should try to go about testing Peter’s rule ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ 
in a way that would help him discover that his rule is or is not the experimenter’s rule 
by citing as few number sequences as you can. Please note that you have three pages 
on which to test your number sequences if you need to. When you feel highly 
confident that you have helped Peter discover that his rule is or is not the 
experimenter’s rule, and not before, you are to write down ‘Peter now knows his rule 
is the experimenter’s rule’ or ‘Peter now knows his rule is not the experimenter’s 
rule’. You are to write this under your most recent number sequence and raise your 
hand. The experimenter will then write whether or not you are correct beside your 
announcement.” 
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Appendix E: Instructions used in experiment 5 
 
“In a previous study investigating human thinking a participant called Peter 
was asked to discover a rule a researcher had in mind that the number sequence 2,4,6 
conforms to. Peter hypothesised that the experimenter’s rule was: ‘even numbers 
ascending in twos’. You know that another participant called James hypothesised that 
the experimenter’s rule was ‘something else’. 
Your aim is to go about testing Peter’s rule ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ 
in a way you think would help him to discover if his rule is the experimenter’s rule. 
You are to do this by writing down other number sequences with sets of three 
numbers. You will then be informed if they conform or do not conform to the rule the 
researcher has in mind.  
You should try to go about testing Peter’s rule ‘even numbers ascending in 
twos’ in a way that would help him discover that his rule is or is not the 
experimenter’s rule by citing as few number sequences as you can. Please note that 
you have three pages on which to test your number sequences if you need to. When 
you feel highly confident that you have helped Peter discover that his rule is  or is not 
the experimenter’s rule, and not before, you are to write down ‘Peter now knows his 
rule is the experimenter’s rule’ or ‘Peter now knows his rule is not the experimenter’s 
rule’. You are to write this under your most recent number sequence and raise your 
hand. The experimenter will then write whether or not you are correct beside your 
announcement.” 
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Appendix F: Recording booklet templates 
 
Recording sheet (18 lines per participant, common to all conditions in which 
participants tested Peter’s hypothesis). 
 
 
 
 
 
Recording sheet (18 lines per participant, common to all conditions in which 
participants tested their own hypothesis). 
 
 
Appendix G 
  
For the purpose of the study please circle yes or no where applicable below if you 
have ever done a problem like this before Yes / No,  
 
Or 
 
if you have taken courses dealing with the concepts of confirmation and falsification 
in the past Yes / No. 
    *Feedback from 
experimenter 
Number  
sequence 
Reasons for 
choice 
Do you expect it to 
conform to Peter’s 
rule 
Do you expect it to 
conform to the 
researcher’s rule 
Does your  
number sequence 
conform to the  
researcher’s rule 
2,4,6  … yes yes y 
     
     
     
     
     
    *Feedback from 
experimenter 
Number  
sequence 
Reasons for 
choice 
Do you expect it to 
conform to your 
rule 
Do you expect it to 
conform to the 
researcher’s rule 
Does your  
number sequence 
conform to the  
researcher’s rule 
2,4,6  … yes yes y 
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